FINANCE
Glen Vasel Professor of Finance
Director of the Heizer Center for Entrepreneurial Studies
He has been a member of the editorial board of various journals, including the Journal of Finance, Financial Management, Review of Financial Studies and the Journal of Financial Intermediation. He is also a research associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and is a member of the Moody's Academic Advisory and Research Committee and served on the Board of Directors of L.R. Nelson.
Professor Petersen was awarded the Sidney J. Levy Teaching Award in 1996, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2006, and 2008 and was honored as Kellogg Professor of the Year in 2000 and the Executive MBA top Professor Award in 2008. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Prior to joining Kellogg Professor Petersen taught at the University of Chicago.
Corporate
Corporate Bankruptcy
Corporate Capital Structure
Debt-Equity Choice
Entrepreneurship
Payout Policy (Dividends, Repurchases)
Pension Funds
Personal Finance
Real Options (Investments)
Risk Management
Small Business Management
Taxation
- Recent Media Coverage
Economist Intelligence Unit: Executive Briefing: Does function follow organizational form? - 11/14/2008
CNN Radio: - 10/7/2008
First Business Morning News: Psychology of Lending - 12/19/2007
The Mint (Dow Jones publication in India): The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending - 4/2/2007
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- Recent Kellogg News
A ‘whole slew of reasons’ to attend Kellogg - 8/5/2009
Too easy to fall off the mountain, say experts at Kellogg Risk Summit - 11/21/2008
Venture capital isn’t dying; it’s evolving, says Kellogg grad - 10/25/2008
Kellogg finance faculty analyze global banking crisis - 10/12/2008
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In corporate finance and asset pricing empirical work, researchers are often confronted with panel data. In these data sets, the residuals may be correlated across firms or across time, and OLS standard errors can be biased. Historically, researchers in the two literatures have used different solutions to this problem. This paper examines the different methods used in the literature and explains when the different methods yield the same (and correct) standard errors and when they diverge. The intent is to provide intuition as to why the different approaches sometimes give different answers and give researchers guidance for their use.
Programming advice and supplementary tables.
Prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics. However, market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm’s source of capital. Examining this intuition, we find firms that have access to the public bond markets, as measured by having a debt rating, have significantly more leverage. Although firms with a rating are fundamentally different, these differences do not explain our findings. Even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure, and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating, firms with access have 35% more debt.
Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying heavily on soft information. We find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to informationally “difficult?credits, such as firms that do not keep formal financial records. Moreover, controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively. All of this is consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks.
The distance between small firms and their lenders is increasing, and they are communicating in more impersonal ways. After documenting these systematic changes, we demonstrate they do not arise from small firms locating differently, consolidation in the banking industry, or biases in the sample. Instead, improvements in lender productivity appear to explain our findings. We also find distant firms no longer have to be the highest quality credits, indicating they have greater access to credit. The evidence indicates there has been substantial development of the financial sector, even in areas such as small business lending.
This paper examines a setting where the two firm's derivative strategies are known but completely different. American Barrick aggressively hedges its gold price risk using derivatives, while Homestake Mining uses no derivatives. Instead they use a combination of operating and financial decisions to manage their risk. The different choice of methods is a result of different abilities to adjust operating costs and different needs for investment capital. Different investment strategies imply that Homestake Mining's capital needs are more highly correlated with gold prices, and thus cashflow hedging has less value. Managerial incentives also play a role. Although risk averse managers have an incentive to reduce risk, how and how much they hedge depends upon how they are compensated. The multitude of risk management methods used by similar firms means that tests of risk management theory must account for different opportunities and different objectives when examining firm's risk management strategies.
One characteristic which may distinguish banks from other financial institutions is the role of relationships between the bank and its borrowers. These firm-lender relationships can help resolve market failures and thus provide a role for banks. This paper describes the theoretical role of lending relationships in financial markets. Relationships can generate useful information as well as be used to constrain borrowers. Empirically, relationships appear to have the greatest effect on the provision of credit opposed to the price at which firms are able to borrow. Finally the paper examines current changes in financial markets and their impact on the durability of lending relationships as well as their continued role in modern financial markets.
This article comments on the paper by Jayaratne and Wolken that studies how bank consolidation has affected the small firm's access to capital. Explanations proposed by the authors for how the shrinkage of small banks affects the access of credit to small firms are reviewed. The prerequisite explanation of how small banks are different from large banks are given. The question of changes to expect in lending when a large bank acquires a small bank is addressed. The authors' examination of marginal firms is reviewed. The finding that no long-term reduction in credit to small firms resulted from the shrinkage of banks is noted. The suggestion that some of the shrinkage may be due to over capacity is explored.
Firms may be financed by their suppliers rather than by financial institutions. There are many theories of trade credit, but few comprehensive empirical tests. This article attempts to fill the gap. We focus on small firms whose access to capital markets may be limited and find evidence suggesting that firms use more trade credit when credit from financial institutions is unavailable. Suppliers lend to constrained firms because they have a comparative advantage in getting information about buyers, they can liquidate assets more efficiently, and they have an implicit equity stake in the firms. Finally, firms with better access to credit offer more trade credit.
This paper provides a simple framework showing that the extent of competition in credit markets is important in determining the value of lending relationships. Creditors are more likely to finance credit constrained firms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. The paper offers evidence from small business data in support of this hypothesis.
When financial markets are imperfect or financial distress is costly, firms may choose to reduce their risk by lowering financial or operating leverage. This paper examines the role of operating leverage in the firm's pension choice. Contributions to defined contribution plans are more flexible than contributions to defined benefit plans. Firms may therefore reduce their operating leverage by selecting a defined contribution plan. I find empirical support for this hypothesis which is robust to controls for labor market factors and the continuing trend toward defined contribution pension plans.
When trades are executed inside the posted bid-ask spread, the posted spread is no longer an accurate measure of transactions costs faced by investors. Using two samples of market orders, one based on orders submitted by retail brokers and one based on orders submitted electronically to the NYSE, we document a significant difference between the posted spread and the effective spread paid by investors. For most orders, the effective spread averages half the posted spread. In addition, when the posted spread widens, only 10 to 22 % of the increase appears in the effective spread. These results have significant implications for any empirical work that uses the posted spread as a measure of the cost of trading. Our findings also document a significant difference in the expected execution price across exchanges. This finding is robust to controls for the type of order, and implies that U.S. equity markets are not completely integrated.
This paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affects the availability and cost of funds to the firm. We analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the Small Business Administration. The primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases. We find smaller effects on the price of credit. Attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit. In sum, relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices.
This paper examines the relative importance of transfers from workers to shareholders in the firm's decision to terminate their overfunded defined benefit pension plans. In contrast to earlier studies, I find evidence that firms terminate their pension plans to relieve themselves of implicit promises to workers of future compensation. In addition, financing and tax considerations influence the reversion decision. The results suggest that the 1986 excise tax on asset reversions reduced termination for reversion by 36 percent in 1986.
The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) significantly lowered the tax cost at which US firms could access their unrepatriated foreign earnings. We use this temporary shock to the cost of financing investment and its variation across firms, to examine the role of financial constraints in the firm’s investment decisions. Controlling for the ability to repatriate foreign earnings in a more tax efficient way under the AJCA, we find that for a majority of firms there was little change in domestic investment – the policy objective of the law. We do find, however, that for a subset of firms which are financially constrained, that a majority of the repatriated funds were invested in approved domestic investment. We find little change in financial policy (e.g. leverage and equity payouts) once we control for the ability to repatriate funds under the AJCA. These findings point out the importance of understanding finance theory when designing optimally targeted tax incentives.
Information is an essential component of all financial markets and transactions. However information can arrive in multiple forms. In this paper, I begin to define what is meant by hard and soft information. Hard information is quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways, and its content is independent of the collection process. Technology is changing the way we communicate and thus must fundamentally change the way financial markets and institutions operate. One of these changes is a greater reliance on hard relative to soft information in financial transactions. This paper discusses the advantages and costs of this substitution and the possible consequences of the hardening of information on both financial markets and institutions as well as those who study them.
Using sophisticated subjects in an environment that should make the norms of economic behavior highly salient (MBAs in a corporate finance class), we test three theories about how people respond to previous investments: escalating commitment, mental budgeting, and marginal decision making. The results support mental budgeting.
We examine the importance of the size quoted by the specialist in the adjustment of prices. The quoted size is the maximum trade size for which the posted quotes are guaranteed. We find that the impact of trades on subsequent quote revisions depends significantly on whether the trade size exceeds the quoted size. Although larger trades are followed by larger quote revisions, most of the variation in quote revisions is explained by whether the trade size exceeds the quoted size. Once it does, further increases in the trade size have no effect. Our results also indicate that only a fraction of trades move the quotes.
This paper examines two pension decisions which firms must make when they offer a defined benefit pension plan: how to pick the appropriate rate for discounting pension liabilities and how to allocate the assets in the pension plan. The correct allocation of assets must be driven by frictions which occur in real world financial markets. In the absence of market frictions, the asset allocation decision is irrelevant. The paper first reviews the theory which describes the optimal asset allocation in the presence of distortionary taxes and imperfect capital markets. This allows us to examine the role played by the pension plan in the financial structure of the firm. It also provides us the background for examining the actual asset allocation of defined benefit pension assets. The paper then turns to the choice of discount rates. If the goal is to value the pension liabilities, the correct discount rate should depend upon the type of risk inherent in the pension promise. The paper begins by developing the theory behind choosing the discount rate in a world without market frictions and then extends the analysis to the presence of market imperfections. I then compare the theory to the actual discount rates chosen by firms. I find that the discount rates are significantly lower than equivalent market rates and are very insensitive to changes in market rates. The framework of the paper provides a background for discussing the implications of the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans on capital markets -- given the perceived difference in how these two types of plans invest their assets.
This paper reports the findings from a new survey of firms that provide 401(k) plans for their employees. Our results suggest that few 401(k) plans replaced pre-existing defined benefit pension plans, although a substantial fraction replaced previous defined contribution thrift and profit sharing plans. Our survey results also provide new evidence on patterns of 401(k) participation. We find significant persistence in firm-level participation rates from one year to the next, which supports the view that 401(k) participants are not making marginal decisions of whether or not to contribute to the plan in a given month, or even year, but rather make long-term commitments to participate in these plans.
This case follows Merck’s pharmaceutical product Vioxx from initial development to launch and subsequent withdrawal, and considers the decisions made at each stage by the Merck executives involved. The case concludes by examining the financial impact of the Vioxx withdrawal on the company and on the Merck stock value. LEARNING OBJECTIVE: Once a decision has turned out so poorly—such as Merck’s decision to launch and support Vioxx—it is easy to criticize. However, are these bad outcomes the result of a good decision which turned out unlucky, or are they decisions where the bad outcome could have been predicted? This case allows the students to examine the various steps of Vioxx’s development and launch. By doing so, they can consider whether the decision making process broke down and why. By connecting the Vioxx launch and withdrawal to changes in Merck’s cash flow and stock market value, the students can document the impact of such decisions on the value of the firm.
West Teleservice, a telemarketing firm, is considering going public at the end of 1996 and the case asks the students to price the IPO. During the previous 18 months, seven other telemarketing firms have gone public. Prior to this, there were no publicly traded telemarketing firms. The industry is in flux. Historically, telemarketing was conducted by wholly owned subsidiaries of telephone companies, banks, and insurance companies. However, cost cutting has caused many of these firms to outsource the business. Thus, although total telemarketing business isn't growing very quickly, the outsourced portion is growing fifty percent per year. This case can be used as an introduction to IPO valuations. It is also designed to demonstrate the use and pitfalls of valuing firms with multiples. Given this is the eighth firm to go public, there are seven other potential comparable firms. The case contains enough information to construct a rough DCF. This is useful to demonstrate what assumptions must be implicit in the multiples to arrive at the same valuation. Finally, the case can be used to discuss the idea of mispriced equity (Myers/Majluf, 1984), since there seems to be evidence that the price of equity is not sustainable.
This case examines the problem faced by Western Southern Enterprise a mutual insurance company at the end of 1996. Their investment in Cincinnati Bell stock has been phenomenally successful, but has left them potentially overweighted in equities in general and a single stock in particular. The cost of diversification is declaring and paying tax on a large capital gain. The possible solutions include maintaining the position, selling the position, or protecting the position by issuing a Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock security (DECS). The case can be used in a tax strategy and/or an advanced financial strategy (financial instruments) class. The case is used to ask the students to trade off the benefits of diversification (which they have to justify) against the cost of declaring the capital gain (which they must quantify). In defending their choices, students are asked to evaluate the various tax and non-tax benefits and costs of each solution. Thus the case can be used to discuss the costs of financial distress (or poor diversification) as well as teach security design. Since the client (WSE) has several potentially contradictory objectives, the case lays out a situation where security design can improve upon the simple alternatives. The case provides structuring details of the DECS and thus you can discuss why various features were included in the design of the DECS.
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Teaching Materials
Finance II - FINC 441Financial Strategy & Tax Planning - FINC 447
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Finance, Finance.
This course is the sequel to FINC-430. The primary objective is to examine the financial decisions of firms with regard to their capital budgeting decisions (which investments to make), dividend decisions and capital structure decisions (how to raise capital). We first examine these decisions in an idealized frictionless world in which the firm cannot change its value by altering its dividend or capital structure policy. We then explore the effect of frictions (e.g. taxes, bankruptcy costs, inefficient or uncompetitive financial markets, or self-interested managers) on the firm's financial decisions and how these decisions can affect a firm's value.
Prerequisites: FINC-430. Corequisite: DECS-434 or equivalent. ACCT-430 and MECN-430 are recommended.
Financial Strategy and Tax Planning (FINC-447-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Finance, Finance.
This course examines the role of taxes in a firm's financial strategy. Tax knowledge is not a prerequisite, and we do not cover the specifics of any one tax code. Instead we study the basic structure of tax codes and identify the fundamental sources of gains from tax planning. General principles are illustrated with examples from past and current tax law in the United States and other countries. Real examples of tax planning and cases are used. We study financial decisions such as the choice of organizational form, investments in real and financial assets, and different methods of financial investments. FINC-465-0 is a prerequisite for this course, but they may be taken concurrently.
Venture Lab (V-Lab) (FINC-915-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Finance
This new course offers students an experiential learning opportunity in the venture capital industry. For the duration of the class term, each student will be placed with a venture capital firm and will be required to submit a project report (presentation) at the end of the quarter based on work the student completed for the firm throughout the academic quarter. The insights from this hands-on course will be most beneficial to students who have not had extensive experience in
the venture capital space, but who would like to pursue a career in that field. More information can be found at: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/heizer/venturelab/
Managerial Finance II analyzes corporate financial decisions. Topics include market efficiency, capital structure, dividend and stock repurchase policy, and firms’ use of options and convertible securities.
Strategic Financial Management (FINCX-442-0)
Strategic Financial Management examines financial management theory and cases. Students use valuation skills to determine the cost of capital, financing and operating issues faced by the firm.
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