Nicola Persico
Nicola Persico

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES
Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences
Faculty Director, Kellogg Public-Private Initiative (KPPI)

Print Overview
Dr. Persico is a Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management. He received his PhD in Economics from Northwestern University in 1996, and spent one year on the faculty at UCLA prior to joining Penn in 1997, where he was granted tenure. He moved to NYU in 2006 as Professor of Economics, and Professor of Law and Society. Dr. Persico joined, Kellogg in 2011. Dr. Persico has received a number of honors and fellowships, including several National Science Foundation Grants, and he was an Alfred P. Sloan research fellow from 2002-2004. He served on the editorial board of the International Economic Review, has been associate editor of Econometrica, and of the Journal of the European Economic Association. He is currently associate editor of The American Economic Review, and co-editor of Theoretical Economics. Dr. Persico has published in the areas of political economy, discrimination, and law and economics.

Areas of Expertise
Contract Theory
Economics of Organizations
Game Theory
Microeconomics
Political Economy/Design
Voting Systems
Print Vita
Education
PhD, 1996, Economics, Northwestern University
PhD, 1995, Mathematical Economics , Trieste, Italy
Laurea, 1991, Economics, Università Bocconi, Magna cum Laude

Academic Positions
Research Associate, NBER, 2006-present
Professor, Economics and Law and Society, New York University, 2006-present
Assistant Professor, Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2001-2006
Visiting Fellow, Economics, Princeton University, 2001-2001
Assistant Professor, Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1997-2001
Assistant Professor, Economics, UCLA, 1996-1997

 
Print Research
Research Interests
Contract Theory, Economics of Organizations, Political Economy/Design, Voting Systems, Microeconomics, Game Theory

Articles
Persico, Nicola, Benjamin Lester and Ludo Visschers. Forthcoming. Information Acquisition and the Exclusion of Evidence in Trials. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Abstract
Persico, Nicola, Dan Silverman and Jose-Carlos Rodriguez-Pueblita. 2011. Factions and Political Competition. Journal of Political Economy. 119(2): 242-288.
AbstractLink
Persico, Nicola, Jan Eeckhout and Petra Todd. 2010. A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns. American Economic Review. 100(3): 1104-35.
Persico, Nicola. 2009. Racial Profiling? Detecting Bias Using Statistical Evidence. Annual Review of Economics. 1: 229-54.
Persico, Nicola and Petra Todd. 2008. The hit rates test for racial bias in motor-vehicle searches. Justice Quarterly. 25(1): 37-53.
Persico, Nicola and Petra Todd. 2006. Generalising the Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, with an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita. The Economic Journal. 116: F351-F367.
Persico, Nicola and Nicolas Sahuguet. 2006. Campaign Spending Regulation in a Model of Redistributive Politics. Economic Theory. 28(1): 95-124.
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2005. A Drawback of Electoral Competition. Journal of the European Economic Association. 3(4): 1318-1348.
Persico, Nicola and Petra Todd. 2005. Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening, and Airport Security. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings.: 127-31.
Persico, Nicola and David Castleman. 2005. Detecting Bias: Using Statistical Evidence to Establish Intentional Discrimination in Racial Profiling Cases. University of Chicago Legal Forum.: 217-35.
Persico, Nicola, Andrew Postlewaite and Dan Silverman. 2004. The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height. Journal of Political Economy. 112(5): 1019-53.
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2004. Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain’s ‘Age of Reform. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 119(2): 707–765.
Persico, Nicola. 2004. Committee Design with Endogenous Information. Review of Economic Studies. 71(1): 165-94.
Persico, Nicola. 2002. Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing. American Economic Review. 92(5): 1472-97.
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2001. The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives. American Economic Review. 91(1): 225-39.
Persico, Nicola, John Knowles and Petra Todd. 2001. Racial Bias in Motor-Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Political Economy. 109(1): 203-29.
Persico, Nicola. 2000. Information Acquisition in Auctions. Econometrica. 68(1): 135-48.
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2000. Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price. Games and Economic Behavior. 30(1): 83-114.
Working Papers
Persico, Nicola, Decio Coviello and Andrea Ichino. Task Juggling.
Persico, Nicola, Decio Coviello and Andrea Ichino. Don't Spread Yourself Too Thin: The impact of task juggling on workers' speed of job completion.
Persico, Nicola, Manolis Galenianos and Rosalie Liccardo. 2008. A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs. The Review of Economic Studies.
Persico, Nicola and Steven Matthews. Information Acquisition and the Excess Refund Puzzle.
Persico, Nicola. Games of Redistributive Politics Are Equivalent to All-Pay Auctions With Consolation Prizes.
Persico, Nicola. Generic Uniqueness of the Solutions to a Continuous Linear Programming Problem.
Book Chapters
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2009. "Electoral Incentives, Political Risk-Taking and Policy Reform." In The Political Economy of Democracy, edited by E. Aragones, C. Bevia, H. Llavador, N. Schofield, Fundación BBVA.
Persico, Nicola and Luigi Montrucchio. 1993. "Acyclicity of Optimal Paths." In Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Social Sciences, edited by F. Gori, L. Geronazzo, M. Galeotti, 283-95. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Cases
Minor, Dylan and Nicola Persico. 2013. The Volcker Rule: Financial Crisis, Bailouts, and the Need for Financial Regulation. Case 5-412-753 (KEL703).
AbstractLink

 
Print Teaching
Teaching Interests
Political Economy, Business Strategy
Doctoral
Topics in Formal Political Theory (MECS-516-0)
This seminar focuses on formal models of bargaining, coalition formation and information within legislatures. Prerequisite: A graduate-level course in game theory.

Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Strategic Management in Non-Market Environments (SEEK-441-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Management & Strategy, Social Enterprise.

The explicit regulations and implicit norms governing a firm's market behavior are determined by myriad social, political, regulatory and legal institutions. These non-market institutions are arenas in which interest groups compete to change the rules to further their goals. This course takes the perspective of managers or consultants who must anticipate how interests and institutions within the non-market environment will react to new issues and develop strategies for affecting outcomes with the goal of improving firm performance. The course introduces students to a set of frameworks and tools that assist managers in non-market analysis and strategy development. Cases focusing on the media, activists, legislatures, regulatory agencies and international trade are used to practice applying the frameworks and formulating effective strategies.