In five experiments we found that deliberation reduces preference consistency. In experiments 1 and 2, participants who deliberated on their preferences were less consistent in their evaluations compared to those who did not deliberate. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this effect is due to the impediment of deliberation and not to the benefit of nondeliberation. We hypothesized that deliberation leads to the inconsistent weighting of information, especially when the information is complex. As such, we predicted and found in experiments 4 and 5 that the extent to which deliberation decreases preference consistency depends upon the complexity of the information.

It has long been assumed that people experience evaluative conflict or ambivalence as unpleasant. In three studies we provide direct evidence for the assumption that ambivalence is unpleasant, but only when one has to commit to one side of the issue. In those situations ambivalence will be related to outcome uncertainty and feelings of discomfort. We examined this prediction using both self-reports and physiological measures. In a first study we manipulated ambivalence and whether or not participants had to take a clear stand vis-a vis the attitudinal issue and choose a position for or against it. Results indicate ambivalence was only related to physiological arousal when a choice had to be made. Feeling ambivalent about an issue without the necessity to choose did not result in higher levels of arousal. A second study replicated and extended these findings by including a measure of subjective uncertainty about the decision. Results showed the same pattern as in Study 1, and indicate that the relation between ambivalence and arousal is mediated by uncertainty about decisional outcomes. In the third and final study these findings are corroborated using self-report measures; these indicated that ambivalence-induced discomfort is related to specific (negative) emotions.

OBJECTIVE: To determine how visceral impulses, such as hunger and drug craving, influence health beliefs. DESIGN: The authors assessed smokers' self-efficacy and intentions to quit while in a randomly assigned state of cigarette craving or noncraving (Study 1), and assessed dieters weight-loss beliefs while hungry or satiated (Study 2). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Self-efficacy, smoking cessation, weight-loss goals. RESULTS: The authors found, in both the context of smoking and weight-loss, that participants in a cold (e.g., satiated) state had different health beliefs than participants in a hot state (e.g., hungry). Specifically, in Study 1, the authors found that smokers who experienced cigarette craving had lower self-efficacy than did satiated smokers. Consequently, smokers who craved a cigarette had less intention to quit smoking in the future compared with satiated smokers. In Study 2, the authors found that hungry dieters had less self-efficacy than did satiated dieters. This difference led hungry dieters to form less ambitious future weight-loss goals and view prior weight-loss attempts with more satisfaction. CONCLUSION: These findings contribute to our understanding of the nature of health beliefs and reveal that health beliefs are more dynamic than previously assumed.

Four studies examined how impulse-control beliefs—the belief in one’s ability to regulation visceral impulses, such as hunger, drug craving, and sexual arousal—influence the self-control process. The findings provide evidence for a restraint bias—the tendency for people to overestimate their capacity for impulse-control. This biased perception of restraint had important consequences for people’s self-control strategies. Inflated impulse-control beliefs led people to overexpose themselves to temptation, thereby promoting impulsive behavior. In Study 4, for example, the impulse-control beliefs of recovering smokers predicted their exposure to cigarette-laden temptation. Recovering smokers with inflated impulse-control beliefs exposed themselves to more temptation, which led to higher rates of relapse four months later. The restraint bias offers unique insight into how our erroneous beliefs about self-restraint promote impulsive behavior.

In two studies, we examined the role of social comparisons in regret management. In the first study, participants received a (relatively) negative outcome after which they were presented with base-rate information about the performance of other participants in the experiment. Results showed that experienced regret decreased as a result of base-rate information showing that most others made even worse decisions than oneself. In the second study, we investigated whether people actively seek this kind of consensual information to validate their decision. After inducing regret by means of a manipulated outcome in a trivia quiz, participants could obtain information about the outcomes of previous participants or about the type of items used in the quiz. Participants' preference was determined by whether or not they believed that they would be given a second chance. In case of a negative and final outcome, participants preferred information about the prevalence of others who had an even worse outcome. When the outcome was non-final, participants preferred information about the type of items used in the test. Both strategies were accompanied with a decrease in regret. Implications for research on regret and decision making are discussed.

Impulsive behavior is a common source of stigma. The authors argue that people often stigmatize impulsive behavior because they fail to appreciate the influence visceral impulses have on behavior. Because people tend to underestimate the motivational force of cravings for sex, drugs, food, and so forth, they are prone to stigmatize those who act on these impulses. In line with this reasoning, in 4 studies, the authors found that participants who were in a cold state (e.g., not hungry) made less favorable evaluations of a related impulsive behavior (impulsive eating) than did participants who were in a hot state (e.g., hungry). This empathy gap effect was tested with 3 different visceral states-fatigue, hunger, and sexual arousal-and was found both when participants evaluated others' impulsive behavior (Studies 1 & 2) and when participants evaluated their own impulsive behavior (Study 3). Study 3 also demonstrated that the empathy gap effect is due to different perceptions of the strength of the visceral state itself. Finally, Study 4 revealed that this effect is state specific: Hungry people, for example, evaluated only hunger-driven impulses, and not other forms of impulse, more favorably.

Perception of control has been a fundamental construct in research on risk-taking behavior. It has been shown, for example, that people tend to underestimate risks that are under their control. Despite its importance, surprisingly, little attention has been paid to what is actually meant by control. In three studies, we argue that the common conceptualization of perceived control is too broad as it fails to distinguish between two distinct aspects of control 'command over exposure to the risk itself (volition)' and 'command over the outcome (control)'. Thus, whether the risk is imposed or freely chosen likely differs from, and has different consequences for, the ability to exert influence over a risky behavior, once it has been initiated. Using a wide variety of risk behaviors (e.g., ecstasy use, unsafe sex), we demonstrate that volition and control exert opposing influence on risk perception: control decreases perceived risk while volition increases perceived risk. This latter prediction is counterintuitive and is explained in terms of the mediating role of anticipated regret: voluntary appraisals elicit anticipated regret, which, in turn, increases perceived risk. This work highlights the dynamic relationship between risk characteristics and anticipated emotion in guiding the perception of risk.

We present a theory about human thought named the unconscious-thought theory (UTT). The theory is applicable to decision making, impression formation, attitude formation and change, problem solving, and creativity. It distinguishes between two modes of thought: unconscious and conscious. Unconscious thought and conscious thought have different characteristics, and these different characteristics make each mode preferable under different circumstances. For instance, contrary to popular belief, decisions about simple issues can be better tackled by conscious thought, whereas decisions about complex matters can be better approached with unconscious thought. The relations between the theory and decision strategies, and between the theory and intuition, are discussed. We end by discussing caveats and future directions.

In two studies we examined the nature and consequence of ambivalent attitudes. In the first study, we assessed whether holding ambivalent attitudes was aversive, and tested whether this aversion was resolved through biased information processing. To do this we manipulated participants’ attributions of the discomfort associated with an ambivalent message through a pill manipulation (tense vs. relaxed). Participants who attributed their discomfort to their ambivalence reported more negative emotions and generated more one-sided thoughts than participants who attributed their discomfort to the pill. In the second study, we examined the conditions necessary for ambivalence reduction. Results suggest that people spontaneously engage in biased information processing in order to resolve their ambivalence.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not always advantageous to engage in thorough conscious deliberation before choosing. On the basis of recent insights into the characteristics of conscious and unconscious thought, we tested the hypothesis that simple choices (such as between different towels or different sets of oven mitts) indeed produce better results after conscious thought, but that choices in complex matters (such as between different houses or different cars) should be left to unconscious thought. Named the "deliberation-without-attention" hypothesis, it was confirmed in four studies on consumer choice, both in the laboratory as well as among actual shoppers, that purchases of complex products were viewed more favorably when decisions had been made in the absence of attentive deliberation.

The present research demonstrates that the extent to which people appreciate the influence past visceral states have had on behavior (e.g., the influence hunger has had on food choice) depends largely on their current visceral state. Specifically, we found that when people were in a hot state (e.g., fatigued), they attributed behavior primarily to visceral influences, whereas when people were in a cold state (e.g., nonfatigued), they underestimated the influence of visceral drives and instead attributed behavior primarily to other, nonvisceral factors. This hot-cold empathy gap was observed when people made attributions about the past behavior of another person or themselves, and proved difficult to overcome, as participants could not correct for the biasing influence of their current visceral state when instructed to do so. These different attribution patterns also had consequences for people's satisfaction with their performance. Those who attributed their poor performance to visceral factors were more satisfied than those who made dispositional attributions.

OBJECTIVE: To determine how visceral impulses, such as hunger and drug craving, influence health beliefs. DESIGN: The authors assessed smokers' self-efficacy and intentions to quit while in a randomly assigned state of cigarette craving or noncraving (Study 1), and assessed dieters weight-loss beliefs while hungry or satiated (Study 2). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Self-efficacy, smoking cessation, weight-loss goals. RESULTS: The authors found, in both the context of smoking and weight-loss, that participants in a cold (e.g., satiated) state had different health beliefs than participants in a hot state (e.g., hungry). Specifically, in Study 1, the authors found that smokers who experienced cigarette craving had lower self-efficacy than did satiated smokers. Consequently, smokers who craved a cigarette had less intention to quit smoking in the future compared with satiated smokers. In Study 2, the authors found that hungry dieters had less self-efficacy than did satiated dieters. This difference led hungry dieters to form less ambitious future weight-loss goals and view prior weight-loss attempts with more satisfaction. CONCLUSION: These findings contribute to our understanding of the nature of health beliefs and reveal that health beliefs are more dynamic than previously assumed.