FINANCE
The Donald C. Clark/ HSBC Professor in Consumer Finance
Professor Lucas's research spans the areas of dynamic asset pricing, federal financial institutions, and corporate finance. She is a co-editor of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a member of the National Academy of Social Insurance.
Past appointments include chief economist, Congressional Budget Office; senior staff economist, Council of Economic Advisers; member Social Security Technical Advisory Panel; and visiting assistant professor at MIT.
She received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago.
Corporate
Corporate Capital Structure
Derivative Securities and Markets (Futures, Options, Commodities)
Equity Markets (Stock Market) (Includes: Asset Pricing, Investments and Portfolio Choice)
Fixed Income Securities and Markets (Includes: Money Markets, Government Debt and Securities)
Government Accounting
Investments and Portfolio Choice (Includes: Asset Pricing, Equity Markets/Stock Market)
Macroeconomics (Includes: Monetary Economics, Federal Reserve, Interest Rates)
Monetary Policy (Monetary Economics, Federal Reserve, Interest Rates)
Money Markets (Interest rates, Yield Curve)
Payout Policy (Dividends, Repurchases)
Pension Funds
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“Chicago Tonight” (WTTW): The Bottom Line: Market Reforms - 4/1/2009
Economist Intelligence Unit: Executive Briefing: Reforming Credit Reform - 3/26/2009
“Chicago Tonight” (WTTW): The Bottom Line: Obama’s foreclosure rescue plan - 2/18/2009
FOX Business: Is the PBGC Next in Line to Ask for a Bailout? - 1/15/2009
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Kellogg Finance Conference ventures into ‘twin storms’ of leverage and liquidity - 11/20/2008
Kellogg finance faculty analyze global banking crisis - 10/12/2008
Kellogg School experts on U.S. bailout: Will it work? - 10/11/2008
Fed bailout - 10/11/2008
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac assume a significant amount of interest and prepayment risk and all of the credit risk for about half of the $8 trillion U.S. residential mortgage market. Their hybrid government-private status, and the perception that they are too big to fail, make them a potentially large, but largely unaccounted for, risk to the federal government. Measuring the size and risk of this liability is technically difficult, but important for the debate over the appropriate regulation of these institutions. Here we take an options pricing approach to evaluating these costs and risks. We evaluate the sensitivity of our estimates to various modeling assumptions, and also to the regulatory regime, including forbearance policies and capital requirements. The analysis highlights the benefits, but also the challenges, of taking on options-based approach to evaluating the value of federal credit guarantees.
Some proposals to replace a part of the Social Security system with individual accounts include a guarantee that beneficiaries will receive a minimum return on those accounts, usually expressed in terms of their currently scheduled benefit. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has developed the capacity to analyze the value of such guarantees and their potential cost to future taxpayers. This background paper compares two approaches for analyzing benefit guarantees, referred to as “probabilistic estimating” and option pricing. It explains how the information supplied by each method can be interpreted to estimate the budgetary effect of guarantees. The paper also raises an important issue about presenting guarantee costs in the budget, and proposes a candidate solution.
CMOs are divided into tranches of various types, in order to segment the interest rate and pre-payment risk into different classes of instruments, creating a class of fairly safe assets. This of course also create a class of fairly, sometimes very risky assets, often known as "toxic waste." In this paper we look for evidence on what types of institutions hold these risky securities, and ask whether holdings seem to be concentrated in government-insured financial institutions.
The recent transfer of several, large defined benefit pension plans to the federal Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) by U.S. airline and steel companies has drawn public attention to the potential cost to the government of this insurance program and the way its costs are reflected in the budget. This study uses an options pricing approach to estimate the cost of federal pension insurance, and identifies policy alternatives that would control risk and make program costs more transparent to the Congress and the public.
Federal loans and guarantees are systematically undervalued in the federal budget, because budget rules mandate a zero price on market risk. This creates an incentive to overly rely on credit enhancement over other forms of assistance. This paper explores how options pricing techniques can be applied to assigning market values to certain federal guarantees, and uses guarantees on loans to Chrysler Corporation and America West Airlines as examples.
Public interest has become widespread in having the federal government invest in private securities (such as stocks and bonds) as a way to increase the flow of budgetary resources to the government. This paper discusses the likely economic and budgetary impact of such policies, and also the options for accounting for such investments.
Macroeconomic forecasters are confronted with two difficult and related questions: how do people form expectations about future government policy, and what is the sensitivity of private investment and saving to government spending and debt? The analysis of this paper suggests simple myopic forecasting rules for the components of future consumption lead to savings rules that are fairly insensitive to even very high levels of government debt. Furthermore, these expectations prove to be close to rational in that predicted growth rates are fairly close to realized growth rates.
This paper suggests a mechanism by which nominal price rigidities can create a transmission mechanism for monetary shocks through relative price distortions in an economy with both spot and contract markets. The globally unique equilibrium time path of interest rates and prices following an impulse shock to the money supply is characterized. The model predicts that prices and interest rates cycle around the new steady state, with real interest rates initially falling and prices overshooting in the case of a positive shock. The volatility of spot prices and interest rates exceeds that of contract prices.
When shareholders have different plans to sell their shares, they will, in general, have different preferences concerning the firm's decision to pay out cash using dividends or share repurchase. We illustrate these different preferences and explore a model of payout policy that highlights the adverse selection costs of repurchases when managers have superior information about the value of the firm. We show that, in the absence of fixed costs to repurchasing shares, there is a separating equilibrium in which managers use taxable dividends to signal the quality of the firm, with better firms paying lower dividends, using repurchases for the remainder of the payout. With fixed costs to repurchasing, small payouts are made via dividend and large payouts are divided between repurchases and dividends, as in the no-fixed cost case. In both cases, the percentage of shares repurchased increases with the size of the payout and larger repurchases are better news.
We examine a decision theoretic model of portfolio choice in which investors face income risk that is not directly insurable. We consider the sensitivity of savings and portfolio allocation rules to different assumptions about utility, the stochastic process for income and asset returns, and market frictions (transactions costs and short-sale constraints). Under CRRA time additive utility, habit persistence utility, and for a broad range of parameterizations, the model predicts that investors wish to borrow and invest all of their savings in stocks. This qualitative implication is robust to the introduction of significant transaction costs in the stock market, and contrasts sharply with portfolio allocation models in which there is no labor income.
We examine an economy in which agents cannot write contracts contingent on future labor income. The agents face aggregate uncertainty in the form of dividend and systematic labor income risk, and also idiosyncratic labor income risk, which is calibrated using the PSID. The agents trade in financial securities to buffer their idiosyncratic income shocks, but the extent of trade is limited by borrowing constraints, short-sales constraints, and transactions costs. By simultaneously considering aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, we decompose the effect of transactions costs on the equity premium into two components. The direct effect occurs because individuals equate the net-of-cost margins. A second, indirect effect occurs because transactions costs result in individual consumption that more closely tracks individual income. In the simulations we find that the direct effect dominates and that the model can produce a sizable equity premium only if transactions costs are large or the assumed quantity of tradable assets is limited.
Managed competition with prefunding could be a useful approach to long-term care. One version, described here, has two main components: First, people would be required to save over their working lives to cover a portion of the expected cost of a minimum required level of long-term-care insurance. Second, people would begin purchasing long-term-care insurance around the time of retirement from one of a number of competing insurers, under a system of managed competition. Potentially large social gains would arise from improving insurance arrangements, distributing long-term-care costs more equitably across and within generations, and eliminating many of the distortions inherent in the current Medicaid program.
Banks know more about the quality of their assets than do outside investors. This informational asymmetry can distort investment decisions if the bank must raise funds from uninformed outsiders. We model the effect of asymmetric information about loan quality on the asset and liability decisions of banks and the market valuation of bank liabilities. The existence of a precautionary demand for riskless securities against future liquidity needs depends on both the regulatory environment and the informational structure. If banks are ex ante identical, they prefer issuing risky debt to fund a withdrawal to holding riskless securities ex ante. If banks have partial knowledge of loan quality, however, high-quality banks may hold riskless securities to signal their quality, enabling them to issue risky debt at a lower interest rate. We present new empirical evidence that banks with higher asset quality do in fact hold more cash and securities.
This paper develops a formal model of the effect of time-varying asymmetric information on the timing and pricing of equity issues when managers are better informed than outside investors. We assume that as time passes, the adverse selection problem becomes more severe as more managers receive a private signal. Under this assumption, the model predicts temporal variation in the quantity of issues, with a bunching of issues after information releases. It also predicts that the price drop at issue announcement increases with the time since the last information release. These predictions are consistent with several recent empirical studies relating equity issues to earnings and dividend announcements.
Analyzes the potential of incomplete insurance markets coupled with undiversifiable idiosyncratic shocks to explain a number of asset pricing puzzles. Study of a model in which agents have access to a limited set of securities markets while facing aggregate and individual uncertainty; Factors limiting the trade.
With time-varying adverse selection in the market for new equity issues, firms will prefer to issue equity when the market is most informed about the quality of the firm. This implies that equity issues tend to follow credible information releases. In addition, if the asymmetry in information increases over time between information releases, the price drop at the announcement of an equity issue should increase in the time since the last information release. Using earnings releases as a proxy for informative events, we find evidence supporting these propositions.
Monetary models based on cash-in-advance constraints make strong predictions about the stochastic properties of endogeneous variables such as the velocity of circulation of money, the rate of inflation, and real and nominal interest rates. We develop numerical methods to understand these predictions because the models cannot be characterized analytically. We calibrate some cash-in-advance models using driving processes estimated from U. S. time-series data to generate model predictions that are compared to sample statistics. Formulations of the models that generate variability in velocity corresponding to the U.S. data typically fail along other dimensions.
This paper presents an information-theoretic, infinite horizon model of the equity issue decision. The model predicts that (a) equity issues on average are preceded by an abnormal positive return on the stock, although for some firms the issue is preceded by a loss; (b) equity issues on average are preceded by an abnormal rise in the market; and (c) the stock price drops at the announcement of an issue. The model provides a measure of the welfare cost of asymmetric information; the welfare loss may be small even if the price drop at issue announcement is large.
This paper models bank asset choice when shareholders know more about loan quality than do outsiders. Because of this informational asymmetry, the price of loans in the secondary market is the price for poor quality loans. Banks desire to hold marketable securities in order to avoid liquidating good quality loans at the "lemons" price, but also have a countervailing desire to hold risky loans in order to maximize the value of deposit insurance. In this context, portfolio composition and bank safety is examined as a function of the market distribution of loan quality, and the distribution of deposits. The model suggests that off-balance sheet commitments have little effect on bankruptcy risk, and induce banks to hold more securities. We also show that an increase in the bank equity requirement will unambiguously increase bank safety in the long run. In the short run, banks are unambiguously riskier on-balance-sheet, although the effect on bank safety is ambiguous.
Prior to passage of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA), the mostly cash-basis federal budget understated costs of loan guarantees relative to other policy alternatives, and overstated the cost of most direct lending. FCRA corrected much of this misstatement of cost by adopting an estimate of the discounted value of the government’s expected net cash flows from loans and guarantees as the budget cost of these programs. However, it failed to make the budget cost of credit and non-credit programs fully comparable. Inconsistencies arise from the restriction under FCRA that cash flows be discounted at Treasury rates, and from the omission of certain administrative costs. As a consequence the budget measure of cost is incomplete. Those omissions bias down the cost of credit, and thereby have the potential to distort policy choices. This paper describes some of the shortcomings of FCRA and proposes some modifications to the Act that would more closely align budget costs of credit and non-credit programs.
The consolidation option is an exotic financial derivative, created by a few paragraphs in the Higher Education Act. It allows students to convert their floating rate loans to a fixed rate equal to the average floating rate on their outstanding loans. In this study we develop an options pricing model to estimate of the cost of the consolidation option, and to evaluate the sensitivity of that cost to changes in rules and economic conditions. The model takes into account borrower behavior, program rules, the stochastic properties of interest rates, default, and the market price of risk. The analysis implies that between 1998 and 2005, the option had an ex post cumulative cost to the government of about $27 billion. We argue that the subsidy is highly inefficient. Its incidence has been largely random, conferring the greatest benefit on those cohorts who happened to graduate when interest rate conditions were most favorable. It also differentially benefited professional students with the largest loan balances, and those with the sophistication to efficiently manage their loans. Since most entering students are likely to be unaware of the option’s true value, it is unlikely to significantly affect educational outcomes. More broadly, the analysis serves as an example of how modern options pricing methods can be used to better inform public policy.
This study revisits two related questions that are fundamental for evaluating proposals for DB pension policy reform -- what is the value of DB pension liabilities, and what investment strategy provides the best hedge of pension obligations? The model takes an options pricing approach, and recognizes that earnings growth and stock returns are positively correlated over long horizons. It provides testable predictions about how pension plan portfolios would vary with differences in firm and worker characteristics if the investment goal of management is to hedge pension liabilities. The model predicts that a large share of a hedge portfolio for active workers would be invested in stocks, with the share in stocks declining as employees age. For companies with relatively few retirees and separated workers, the observed investment practice appears roughly consistent with a hedging strategy. For the many firms with a high proportion of retirees and separated workers, however, a hedge portfolio would be invested almost entirely in bonds, a prediction sharply at odds with observed behavior. Empirical evidence on how pension investment policy varies with the share of active relative to total participants supports the prediction that firms with a greater percentage of active workers invest more heavily in stocks, although the overall allocation to stocks is much higher than predicted by a hedging demand. Stock holdings also appear to increase with the firm’s expected return on assets. Asset allocation appears to be unaffected by the extent of under-funding, firm asset volatility, or leverage.
The weak connection between federal budget totals and the long-term obligations that the Congress regularly incurs raises the question of whether federal accounting rules are in need of fundamental reform. A reform that addresses the concern that obligations should be recognized when they are incurred, rather than when they are paid for, is to put more programs in the federal budget on an accrual basis. In this paper I examine what this would entail, both practically and conceptually, and provide rough estimates of how the 2002 budget balance would have changed had Social Security, Medicare, and the retirement programs for federal workers and military personnel, been recorded on a true accrual basis.
In contrast to the shareholders of public corporations, entrepreneurs typically hold large and undiversified equity stakes in their own businesses. In this paper we examine how access to debt financing can influence the choices of entrepreneurs through its affect on the allocation of risk. We focus on the situation of an entrepreneur, who, by including debt in the firm’s capital structure, can reduce personal exposure to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. This has implications for optimal capital structure and for the interaction between capital structure and entrepreneurs’ portfolio choice, as well as for the hurdle rate used for capital budgeting and hence for the level of investment activity in the economy.
Policymakers worldwide are contemplating investing public pension assets in the stock market -- or allowing their citizens to make this choice -- and many countries have recently begun to do so. This is motivated by concerns that existing public systems will be unable to provide benefits to a rapidly aging population without sharp increases in taxes on future workers, and by the perception that the higher average return on stocks could help alleviate these pressures. Economists have also suggested that including stock market investments in public pension plans could improve risk sharing within and between generations. In this paper we evaluate these arguments qualitatively and quantitatively. We consider the implications of such policies for asset prices and risk sharing using a calibrated overlapping-generations model.
In this paper, we summarize the evidence on the large and systematic differences in portfolio composition across individuals with varying characteristics, and evaluate some of the theories that have been proposed in terms of their ability to account for these differences. Variation in background risk factors, from sources such as labor and entrepreneurial income or real estate holdings, transactions costs, and life cycle considerations, can explain some but not all aspects of cross-sectional observations of portfolio holdings in a traditional utility maximizing framework. Remaining challenges for quantitative theories include a compelling explanation for the high rate of non-participation in the stock market despite a considerable equity premium, and the apparent lack of diversification of many individual portfolios.
The existence of two competing government student loan programs provides a unique opportunity to compare the cost to the government of direct federal lending versus loan guarantees. The cost of capital in the private student loan program is used to infer the market price of risk for federally-backed loans. We find that budget costs for both programs are well below their market value. It appears that the guaranteed program is fundamentally more expensive than the direct program, primarily because guaranteed lenders are paid more than is required to induce them to lend at statutory terms.
In this paper we revisit the question of the cost of risk to the federal government and its implications, both conceptual and practical, for federal budgeting. We emphasize the budgetary rationale for including the cost of risk, which is related to, but distinct from, the economic rationale for treating risk as a cost to the government. We survey the evidence on the cost of risk for several federal loan and insurance programs, and find that the cost of risk is significant. We conclude that when feasible, considerations of consistency and transparency favor using market values in budgeting.
Estimates for the size of the implicit Federal guarantees for debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have ranged from $200 million (Stiglitz et al, 2002) to $122 to $182 billion (Passmore, 2005). This paper extends and updates the estimates in Lucas and McDonald (2006), by simultaneously estimating the current stock price and the possible future loss, and permitting jumps in asset value. We annuitized expected losses of 15-20 basis points, with a present value in the vicinity of $20 billion.
Can the historical equity premium be explained as a rational equilibrium outcome when risk-averse agents with conventional preferences are faced with non-diversifiable sources of risk (e.g., from labor or entrepreneurial income), and when trading frictions prevent them from using financial assets to effectively self-insure transitory shocks? Our research suggests that it is difficult to generate the historical equity premium in realistically parameterized models of this sort. Nevertheless, investigations of these factors clearly reveal the ingredients necessary for any consumption-based model to match returns data. Using simplified versions of some of our earlier models and other models in the literature, in this paper we illustrate the promise and limitations of incomplete risk diversification and trading frictions as explanations for the equity premium puzzle. We also present new results on the likely importance of entrepreneurial income risk.
Most of the major results in academic finance rely on the assumption that markets are reasonably efficient. Since financial theory directly impacts practice, it means that most financial decision-makers directly or indirectly rely on the idea of market efficiency. That assumption is reflected in the standard advice of investment advisers, and the standard tools used by businesses to evaluate investment choices. This chapter reviews the logic behind the market efficiency hypothesis, and explains its main implications for investors and managers. It is argued that although the centrality of market efficiency may be unsettling to some people, it is a unifying and robust principle.
The link between the real and financial decisions of firms has been studied for many years, yet it remains poorly understood. Neoclassical investment theories such as Tobin's q posit a direct, simple link between the market's valuation of the firm and investment decisions: firms invest when the market value of an investment exceeds the cost of the investment. For a variety of reasons—agency conflicts between management and security holders, conflicts among security holders, and asymmetric information between management and security holders—the relation between real and financial decisions may be quite complex.
In this paper we study seasoned equity issues as one piece of the corporate financing and investment puzzle. We expect equity issues to be particularly revealing about the role of asymmetric information in financing decisions. First, to the extent that there is asymmetric information between management and outside security holders, the asymmetry should be of greatest concern to potential buyers of common stock since stock is the residual claim on the firm. Second, it is well documented that stocks exhibit large abnormal returns during the period surrounding an equity issue. This suggests that equity issues do in fact reveal valuable information to the market. It is therefore natural to consider whether the price behavior of an equity-issuing firm sheds light on the importance of asymmetric information in the investment process.
This paper evaluates the cost to the federal government of the housing GSEs, and estimates the division of benefits between homeowners and GSE shareholders.
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Finance, Finance
This course combines the materials of FINC-430 and FINC-441 into an intensive one-quarter course available to One-Year students and first-year students interested in accelerating their studies of finance. Students choosing this option should expect the presentations, readings and other homework to be at least double those of the regular courses. By combining these two courses into one quarter, students are able to take more advanced finance electives during their first year and have the opportunity to include an extra finance elective in their course schedules. Please note that this course carries the weight of one course only.
Prerequisites: Knowledge of (a) probability and statistics through linear regression and (b) financial accounting. Requirement (a) may be satisfied with prior or concurrent registration in DECS 434, sufficient previous course work in statistics or attending Finance I statistics tutorials (available fall quarter only). Requirement (b) may be satisfied with prior or concurrent registration in ACCT 430 or sufficient previous course work in financial accounting. MECN 430 is recommended.
Fixed Income Securities (FINC-464-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Finance, Finance.
This advanced course is designed for students seeking a sophisticated understanding of fixed income valuation and hedging methods, and a basic familiarity with the major markets and instruments. Tools include duration, convexity, yield curve models, option pricing models and value at risk, which are used to understand pricing and hedging of forwards, futures and swaps, asset-backed securities and other fixed income derivatives. This information is most useful for students planning a career in sales and trading, portfolio management, banking or financial consulting. The course also surveys some of the institutional features of these markets.
Prerequisites: FINC-441. FINC-465 is strongly recommended.
This course counts toward the following majors: Finance
This course focuses on modern developments in the modeling and pricing of financial derivative securities. Both theoretical and practical estimation issues will be addressed, with the aim of providing students with the necessary background to pursue further academic or practitioner-oriented research in this area. Topics include the pricing of derivatives on equity, foreign exchange, volatility, interest rates, credit risk, and mortgages. A variety of modeling approaches are considered including closed form models, Monte Carlo simulation, and models that admit jumps, stochastic volatility, and non-normal distributions.
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