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Jin Li
Jin Li

MANAGEMENT & STRATEGY
Assistant Professor of Management & Strategy

Print Overview
Jin Li is Assistant Professor of Management and Strategy at Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. Prior to Kellogg, he received his PhD in economics from M.I.T. Professor Li’s research interests include labor economics, organizational economics, and applied microeconomics. Professor Li has studied tacit collusion in auction, worker turnover with asymmetric information, and the role of learning and assignment in wage determination. Recently, he has been studying how the possibility of replacement influences long-term economic relationship and how market competition affects firm organization. At Kellogg, Professor Li teaches human resources management to MBA students and organizational economics to doctoral students.

Areas of Expertise
Contract Theory
Economics of Organizations
Information Economics
Microeconomics
Strategy
  • Recent Media Coverage

    The Economist Intelligence Unit: Executive Briefing--Going, going, wrong: Competition and collusion among auction bidders

    The Economist (Newsbook blog): News from the schools, July/August 2010

    WTTW-TV (Chicago Tonight): Swedish Covenant Hospital

    See all Kellogg in the Media
Print Vita
Education
PhD, 2007, Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
BS, 2002, Applied Mathematics, California Institute of Technology
BA, 2002, Economics and Mathematics, Wesleyan University

Academic Positions
Donald P. Jacobs Scholar, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2007-present

 
Print Research
Research Interests
Labor economics, organizational economics

Articles
Li, Jin and Charles Plott. 2008. Tacit Collusion in Auctions and Conditions for Its Facilitation and Prevention: Equilibrium Selection in Laboratory Experimental Markets. Economic Inquiry. Forthcoming
Abstract
Working Papers
Brown, Jennifer and Jin Li. 2010. Going For It: The Adoption of Risky Strategies in Tournaments.
Li, Jin and Niko Matouschek. 2011. A Burden of Past Promises.
Li, Jin. 2011. A Theory of Wage Dynamics with Pareto Learning and Assignment.
Abstract
Li, Jin. 2011. Job Mobility, Wage Dispersion, and Asymmetric Information.
Abstract
Li, Jin, Pak Hung Au and Yuk-fai Fong. 2010. Ownership Turnover, Reputation Turnaround, and Endogenous Cost of Control.
Fong, Yuk-fai and Jin Li. 2010. Relational Contracts, Efficiency Wage, and Employment Dynamics.
Fong, Yuk-fai and Jin Li. 2010. Information Revelation in Relational Contracts.
Fong, Yuk-fai and Jin Li. 2009. A Theory of Player Turnover.

 
Print Teaching
Teaching Interests
Labor economics, contract theory, and organizational economics
Doctoral
Economics of Organization (MECS-449-2)
This course studies the internal organization of firms. We discuss a selection of classic and new papers in organizational economics, and cover both theoretical and empirical papers. Topics include: the provision of incentives in firms, careers and career concerns, promotions and human capital acquisition, delegation and authority, effects of strategic transmission of information within firms, and causes and effects of hierarchy.

Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Personnel Strategy (MGMT-440-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Human Resource Management, Management & Strategy.

Labor can be viewed as an input to firms' production processes. Labor markets are, however, very different from other input markets firms face. To manage human resources effectively, managers need to understand how and why labor markets are so unique. This course focuses on the specific properties of labor markets, and helps students develop effective strategies for managing this vital input. This course is targeted at students interested in careers as general managers, management consultants or entrepreneurs. Topics include job-market matching, non-wage compensation and benefits, training and human capital, careers and employees' career concerns, seniority, promotions, raids and offer-matching, job-market signaling, retirement, stock-option based pay, CEO compensation, up-or-out systems, discrimination in labor markets, goals and methods of labor unions, and more. Teaching methods include a mix of case discussion and lectures. Evaluation will be based on group work (problem sets and a project) and individual exams.

Strategy & Organization (MGMT-452-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Managerial Analytics, Managerial Economics, Managament & Strategy

This course focuses on the link between organizational structure and strategy, making heavy use of the microeconomic tools taught in MECN-430. The core question students address is how firms should be organized to achieve their performance objectives. The first part of the course takes the firm's activities as given and studies the problem of organizational design; topics may include incentive pay, decentralization, transfer pricing, and complementarities. The second part examines the determinants of a firm's boundaries and may cover such topics as outsourcing, horizontal mergers, and strategic commitment.