MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES
Associate Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences
Professor Peter Klibanoff joined the Kellogg faculty in 1994 after receiving his PhD in Economics from MIT.
His research interests span a range of topics in economic theory. Some topics of special interest include decision theory, especially issues related to modeling decision making under uncertainty and ambiguity; optimal pricing and regulation; game theory including mechanism design; and asset pricing. His research has appeared in leading journals such as Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Finance, Theoretical Economics and the Review of Economic Studies.
He teaches competitive strategy and statistics at the MBA level and decision theory at the doctoral level. His MBA statistics textbook (Managerial Statistics: A Case-Based Approach) is published by South-Western Cengage Learning (formerly Thomson South-Western).Behavioral Finance (Includes: Behavioral Economics)
Economic Theory
Economics of Uncertainty
Game Theory
Microeconomics
Regulation
We axiomatize a subjective version of the recursive expected utility model. This development extends the seminal results of Kreps and Porteus (Econometrica 46:185–200 (1978)) to a subjective framework and provides foundations that are easy to relate to axioms familiar from timeless models of decision making under uncertainty. Our analysis also clarifies what is needed in going from a represention that applies within a single filtration to an across filtration representation.
This paper proposes a preference-based condition for stochastic independence of a randomizing device in a product state space. This condition is applied to investigate some classes of preferences that allow for both independent randomization and uncertainty or ambiguity aversion (a la Ellsberg). For example, when imposed on Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) preferences in a Savage framework displaying uncertainty aversion in the spirit of Schmeidler [27], it results in a collapse to Expected Utility (EU). This shows that CEU preferences that are uncertainty averse in the sense of Schmeidler should not be used in settings where independent randomization is to be allowed. In contrast, Maxmin EU with multiple priors preferences continue to allow for a very wide variety of uncertainty averse preferences when stochastic independence is imposed. Additionally, these points are used to reexamine some recent arguments against preference for randomization with uncertainty averse preferences. In particular, these arguments are shown to rely on preferences that do not treat randomization as a stochastically independent event.
In this note, an $O ( | V |k )$ algorithm is described for determining whether an interval graph on $| V |$ vertices has a bandwidth less than or equal to a given integer $k$. While the algorithm is not the first to resolve this problem, it does admit a shorter proof of its correctness than a previous algorithm of the same complexity due to Kratsch (Information and Computation, 74 (1987), pp. 140–158)
The decision maker is in charge of procurement auctions at the department of transportation of Orangia (a fictitious U.S. state). Students are asked to assist him in estimating the winning bids in various auctions concerning highway repair jobs using data on past auctions. The decision maker is faced with various professional, statistical, and ethical dilemmas.
In Case (B) models for computing optimal bids in highway procurement auctions are developed from the perspective of the bidders.
An asset management company must replace the manager of its two signature mutual funds, who is about to retire. Two candidates have been short-listed. The management team is divided and cannot decide which of the two candidates would make the better mutual fund manager. The retiring manager presents a linear regression model to examine success factors of mutual fund managers. This linear regression is the starting point for the subsequent analysis.
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Consulting, Management & Strategy, Managerial Economics.
The course studies the determinants nature of competitive strategy in a variety of industry structures. The course considers how the structure of a firm's industry affects its strategic choices and performance. Topics include the dynamic aspects of pricing, entry and predation in concentrated industries, and product differentiation, product proliferation and innovation as competitive strategies.
Economics of Competition prepares students to diagnose the determinants of an industry’s structure and formulate rational, competitive strategies for coping with that structure.
This PhD-level course on decision theory focuses on axiomatic theories of individual decision making under risk and uncertainty. The course briefly explores utility theory under certainty and the notion of preferences and their representation, then progresses to the classic theories of decision under risk and uncertainty: von Neumann and Morgenstern, Anscombe and Aumann, and Savage. This lasts roughly half the course and constitutes a basic grounding in the subject. From there the course explores topics that expand on the classical work and are nearer to the current research frontier. These topics may include Allais Paradox, Prospect Theory and Machina's approach; Ellsberg's paradox, uncertainty aversion, and Gilboa and Schmeidler representations; dynamics - Bayesian updating, consistency, preferences over the timing of the resolution of risk/uncertainty; and notions of belief and probability in decision making.
PHONE: 847-491-5153
FAX: 847-467-1220
Jacobs Center Room 540