FINANCE; ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION; HEALTH ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT
Assistant Professor of Finance
Professor Hochberg’s research has been published in top tier journals, including the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Accounting Research, and the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, and has been presented at numerous universities and governmental bodies around the world. Prior to arriving at Kellogg, Professor Hochberg was an Assistant Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the Johnson School of Management at Cornell University, and was employed in the technology industry in both larger and startup companies.
Corporate
Corporate Governance
Entrepreneurial Finance
Entrepreneurship
Small Business Management
Venture Capital and Private Equity
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We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation. Lobbying firms appear likely to be characterized by agency problems, rather than primarily motivated by concerns over high compliance costs. We compare the returns of lobbying firms to the returns of less affected firms. Cumulative returns during the five and a half months leading up to passage of SOX were approximately 7 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms. Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors’ positive expectations with regards to the effects of these provisions of the law were warranted.
Recent studies suggest that the underperformance of IPO's in the post-1970 sample may be a small sample effect or Peso problem. That is, IPO underperformance may be due to observing too few star performers ex-post than were expected ex-ante. We develop a model of IPO performance that captures this intuition, by allowing returns to be drawn from mixtures of outstanding, benchmark, or poor performance. We estimate the model under the null of no ex-ante average IPO underperformance to construct small sample distributions of various statistics measuring IPO relative performance. We find that small sample biases are extremely unlikely to account for the magnitude of the post-1970 IPO underperformance observed in data.
Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm’s-length, spot market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational structure in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments. We find that better-networked VC firms experience significantly better fund performance, as measured by the proportion of investments that are successfully exited through an IPO or a sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better-networked VCs are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent financing and eventual exit. We also provide initial evidence on the evolution of VC networks.
We examine whether options granted to rank and file employees affect the performance of the firm by exploring the link between option portfolio implied incentives and firm operating performance. We employ an instrumental variables approach that combines information about the labor market characteristics in which firms compete with information on firm option programs from the IRRC to identify causal effects. Firms whose non-executive employee option portfolios have higher implied incentives exhibit higher subsequent operating performance. Consistent with economic theories, the incentive-performance effect is larger in smaller firms and in firms with higher growth opportunities. Additionally, the incentive-performance effect is concentrated solely in firms that grant options broadly to non-executive employees, consistent with non-executive options inducing mutual monitoring among co-workers.
We examine whether networks among incumbent venture capital firms help restrict entry into local VC markets in the U.S., thus improving VCs’ bargaining power over entrepreneurs. We show that VC markets with more extensive networking among the incumbent players experience less entry. The effect is sizeable economically and appears robust to plausible endogeneity concerns. Entry is accommodated if the entrant has established relationships with a target-market incumbent in its own home market. In turn, incumbents appear to react strategically to an increased threat of entry, in the sense that they freeze out any incumbent that builds a relationship with a potential entrant. Finally, companies seeking venture capital raise money on worse terms in more densely networked markets while increased entry is associated with higher valuations.
This course counts toward the following majors: Entrepreneurship & Innovation, Finance.
This course is designed to develop, mainly through the real-world experiences of venture capitalists and private equity investors, an understanding of the key issues in private equity investing and creating long-term value in privately held companies. It is hoped that students will develop an appreciation of the kinds of judgments involved in entrepreneurial companies at various points in the risk-return continuum, from start-ups to leveraged buyouts to recapitalizations. All aspects of private equity investing are addressed including sourcing, qualifying and analyzing deals; negotiating, structuring and pricing; creating value; and realizing value through various kinds of exit strategies.
For more information, please go to:
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/hochberg/htm/445info.html
Case Studies in Venture Investment (Formerly FINC-932-0) (FINC-471-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Entrepreneurship & Innovation, Finance, Health Enterprise Management
This course is aimed at students who are considering a career in the entrepreneurial sector, including those who wish to start new ventures, join new and growing organizations, or to work in private equity, venture capital or business development.
The class is based on a series of cases that focus on the venture capital investment process, evaluation of business ventures and the subsequent management of such ventures. The primary perspective is that of the venture capitalist in assembling and evaluating information, preparing forecasts, assessing risks, developing and negotiating investment structure and terms, and deciding whether to invest. Cases also focus on management and financial problems and policy issues, and the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The secondary perspective is that of the entrepreneur and the techniques and skills employed in managing growing enterprises. The course will revolve around student discussion and analysis of real-life business plans, with participation of the involved venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
Note: The course will consist of three lecture sessions and six to seven case sessions. Please note that case sessions will likely run 3.5-4 hours, whereas lecture sessions will be likely run shorter (the total academic hours will remain 30). Students will receive an exact schedule prior to the start of the quarter.
FINC-445 is a prerequisite for this course, but they may be taken concurrently.
For more information, please go to:
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/hochberg/htm/932info.html.
Venture Lab (V-Lab) (FINC-915-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Finance
This new course offers students an experiential learning opportunity in the venture capital industry. For the duration of the class term, each student will be placed with a venture capital firm and will be required to submit a project report (presentation) at the end of the quarter based on work the student completed for the firm throughout the academic quarter. The insights from this hands-on course will be most beneficial to students who have not had extensive experience in
the venture capital space, but who would like to pursue a career in that field. More information can be found at: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/heizer/venturelab/
PHONE: 847-467-4574
FAX: 847-491-5719
Jacobs Center Room 401