We study elections with three candidates under plurality voting. A candidate is a Condorcet loser if the majority of the voters place that candidate at the bottom of their preference rankings. We first show that a Condorcet loser might win the election in a three-way race. Next we introduce to the model an endorser who has private information about the true probability distribution of the preferences of the voters. Observable endorsements facilitate coordination among voters who may otherwise split their votes and lead to the victory of the condorcet loser. When the endorser has an ideological bias towards one of the candidates, the coordination impact of endorsements remains unaltered, moreover the endorser successfully manipulates the outcome of the election in favor of his bias, even if his ideological bias is known by the voters. The results are true for any endorsement cost and any magnitude of bias as long as the electorate is large enough.

In a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a
unit surplus. The matching market
serves as an endogenous outside option for agents in a bargaining
relationship. Behavioral agents are (strategically inflexible) commitment types that
demand a constant portion of the unit surplus. The steady state frequency of behavioral types in the
market is determined in equilibrium. We show, even if behavioral types are
negligible, they substantially effect the terms of trade and
efficiency. In an unbalanced market where the entering flow of one
side is short, bargaining follows equilibrium play in a bargaining
game with one-sided reputation, the terms of trade are determined by
the commitment types on the short side, and commitment types improve
efficiency. In a balanced market where the entering flows of the two
sides are equal, bargaining follows equilibrium play in a bargaining
game with two-sided reputation and commitment types cause
inefficiency. An inefficient equilibrium with persistent delays and
break-ups is constructed. The magnitude of inefficiency is
determined by the inflexible demands of the commitment types and is independent
of the fraction of the commitment types entering the market.

Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games with long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to stage games where two players, with equal discount factors, move sequentially. A pure Stackelberg action is assumed to exist. One and two sided reputation results are provided. If one of the players is a Stackelberg type with positive probability, then that player receives the highest individually rational payoff in all perfect equilibria, as agents become patient. If both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability, then equilibrium payoffs converge to a unique payoff vector; and the equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition. All results generalize to simultaneous move stage games, if the stage game is a game of strictly conflicting interest.

Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated
games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We
restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players
with equal discount factors play a stage game where actions are
imperfectly observed and the first mover advantage is maximal. The
set of types for player 1 is taken as any countable subset of the
set of all finite automaton. In this context a one sided reputation
result is provided. If player 1 is a Stackelberg type with positive
probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly observed, then
player 1 receives the highest individually rational payoff in all
Bayes Nash equilibria, as agents become patient.

We study a class of moral hazard games between a long lived agent and an inifnite sequence of short lived principals. We assume that principals cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals, and makes public announcements every period. The set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system. We show that absent reputation effects, information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs. However, if there is an initial probability that the agent is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period, then there exists a rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that, the expected present discounted payoff of the agent is almost his Stackelberg payoff after every history. This is in contrast to Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004), where it is shown that reputation effects do not last long in such games if principals can observe all past signals. We also construct rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all principals, while decreasing the agent's payoff.