ACCOUNTING INFORMATION & MANAGEMENT
Leonard Spacek Professor of Accounting Information & Mngt
Chair of Accounting Information & Management Department
Professor Dye's teaching and research interests include managerial accounting, management compensation, financial disclosure, information economics, and the economics of standards. He is the author of more than 25 papers which have appeared in leading academic journals of accounting and economics, including The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Rand Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Business, and the Journal of Political Economy. He is a member of the editorial boards of the Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, and the Review of Accounting Studies.
Professor Dye regularly gives seminars at leading international business schools. Most recently, he has been studying and lecturing on how firms' can improve their strategic decision-making through their accounting choices.
Control Systems
Corporate Governance
Cost Accounting
Financial Accounting
Financial Disclosure/Statements
Financial Reporting
Information Economics
Management Compensation
Managerial Accounting
Performance Evaluations
Security Analysis
- Recent Media Coverage
Chicago Tribune: Ex-Reagan aide charged with fraud - 3/27/2007
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Shaffer Lombardo Shurin (Kansas City)
Freeman Freeman & Salzman (Chicago)
Novack and Macey LLP (Chicago)
Cravath, Swaine, & Moore LLP (New York)
Dairy Queen Operators’ Association and Cooperative
Crowell & Moring (Washington)
Baker & McKenzie (London and Hong Kong)
Internal Revenue Service
State Farm Insurance (Chicago)
This paper studies the allocational effects associated with the precision of accounting estimates when the precision of estimates is a choice variable for firms. One part of the paper considers the effects of the observability of precision choices. We show that, generally, making precision choices private increases firms' equilibrium precision choices and also, as a by-product, their equilibrium investment choices. We further show that, when firms' precision choices are private, there may be a "disclosure trap," in which, unless investors conjecture the owner has chosen an estimate with the highest possible precision, the owner will respond to investors' conjecture by choosing an estimate whose precision is higher than investors' conjecture. In a multifirm version of the model with endogenous investment, we show that the equilibrium investment by the firm increases in the precision of the firm's own estimate and decreases in the precisions of other firms' estimates. Finally, we show that, in a setting where the firm's initial owner sells his stake in the firm over the course of two periods, with disclosures of estimates of the firm's value occurring prior to each sale of shares, if the precisions of the estimates are public, the equilibrium precisions of the estimates increase over time when the owner sells a sufficiently large fraction of the firm in the first period, and otherwise the equilibrium precisions of estimates remain constant over time.
In an agency setting where the agent must be compensated both to exert effort to produce a new project and to announce honestly when the new project has been produced, we show that Holmstrom's (1979) well-known "informativeness criterion" does not, by itself determine whether a variable is optimally incorporated into the agent's contract. What also matters is how "severe" the control problem is between the principal and the agent. We further show that the severity of the moral hazard problem also determines whether it is desirable for the principal to have the agent implement the project more often than warranted by first-best implementation considerations.
This paper studies how an accountant's method of aggregating information in a financial report is affected by differences in the reliability and relevance of components of the report. We study a firm that hires an accountant to produce a report that reveals information to investors regarding the returns to the firms past investments. In constructing the report, the accountant must combine information elicited from the firm's manager with other information directly observable to the accountant. The manager's information is assumed to be directly observable only by the manager and to be of superior quality to the other information available to the accountant. Reliability-relevance trade-offs arise because as the accountant places more weight on the manager's report, potentially more useful information gets included in the report, at the cost of encouraging the manager to distort his or her information to a greater extent. Capital market participants anticipate this behavior and price the firm accordingly. We show how the market's price response to the release of the firm's aggregate report, the efficiency of the firm's investment decisions, and the manager's incentives to manipulate the soft information under his or her control are all affected by - and affect - the aggregation procedure the accountant adopts. In addition, we identify a broad range of circumstances under which aggregated reports are strictly more efficient than disaggregated reports because aggregation tempers the manager's misreporting incentives. We also demonstrate that, as any given component of the aggregated accounting report becomes softer, the equilibrium level of the firm's investment diminishes and the market places greater weight on the remaining components of the report.
This paper studies a manager's attempt to maximize his firm's discounted expected profits by choosing what strategic actions to select and what performance measurement system to employ in a setting where the manager is uncertain about what variables "drive" the firm's profits, the firm's profit drivers remain stationary over time, and strategic actions differ in the amount of information they produce about the firm's profit drivers. For each available performance measurement system, this paper identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for experimentation - that is, deviating from the firm's short-run expected profit-maximizing action - to be optimal. In addition, the paper determines what factors influence a firm's preferred performance measurement system, and it explains why the preferred performance measurement system is likely to change over time.
This paper studies when a firm will acquire additional information about a potential new project by consulting outsiders, when doing so runs the risk of reducing the value of implementing the project as a consequence of information leakage. The analysis evaluates the firm's information acquisition activities in both the presence and absence of moral hazard in project production.
This paper studies a model of Classifications Manipulation in which accounting reports consist of one of two binary classifications, preparers of accounting reports prefer one classification over the other, and accounting standards designates the official requirements that have to be met to receive the preferred classification, and preparers may engage in classifications manipulation in order to receive their preferred accounting classification. The possibility of classifications manipulation creates a distinction between the official classification described in the statement of the accounting standard and the de facto classification, determined by the “shadow standard” actually adopted by preparers. The paper studies the selection and evolution of accounting standards in this context. Among other things, the paper evaluates “efficient” accounting standards, it determines when there will be “standards creep,” it introduces and analyses the notion of a Nash accounting standard, and it compares the standard set by sophisticated standard setters to those set with less knowledge of firms financial reporting environments.
Capital market participants collectively may possess information about the valuation implications of a firm's change in strategy not known by the management of the firm proposing the change. This paper asks whether a firm's management can exploit the capital market's information in deciding either whether to proceed with a contemplated strategy change or whether to continue with a previously initiated strategy change. In the case of a proposed strategy change, it is shown that managers can extract the capital market's information by announcing the potential new strategy, and then conditioning the decision to implement the new strategy on the size of the market's price reaction to the announcement. Under this arrangement, it is shown that a necessary condition to implement all and only positive net present value changes is that managers proceed to implement some strategies that garner negative price reactions upon their announcement. In the case of deciding whether to continue with a previously implemented strategy change, it is shown that it may be optimal for the firm to predicate its abandonment/continuation decision on the magnitude of the costs it has already incurred. Thus, what looks like "sunk-cost" behavior may in fact be optimal.
This is a critique of "Essays on Disclosure" and the literature reviewed in "Essays". The critique evaluates "Essays" in terms of its coverage of the relevant literature, its insightfulness, and its boldness in identifying future research areas. It also provides commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of several popular models in the literature. It concludes with a discussion of recent trends in the disclosure literature.
Comments on the occurrence of competition into the accounting standard-setting process in the U.S. Analysis of the data concerning the status quo between Financial Accounting Standard Board and International Accounting Standards Board; Experimentation cost in standard setting; Protection of corporations against capture of regulatory body.
The article presents the results of a study that focused on a principal-agent contracting problem in which a manager privately chooses among projects with differing risk-return frontiers and in which the manager's effort choice alters the risk-return frontier of whatever project he selects. The study found that a manager's optimal report about his chosen project's mean is always downward biased and that the extent of this bias increases with the variance of the project's output, the manager's risk-aversion, and the "bonus" portion of the manager's compensation.
This paper studies voluntary disclosures in a model in which investors probabilistically become informed about whether a firm has received information. The firm's value is established via a first price, sealed bid, common value auction. The paper demonstrates that the threshold level determining whether the firm withholds or discloses information uniformly declines in the probability investors are informed. The paper also shows that, northwithstanding the risk-neutrality of investors, the expected selling price of the firm strictly decreases (increases) in the probability individual investors are informed when that probability is small (large). These results follow from "winner's curse" effects.
We reexamine the "uniformity vs. flexibility" debate by considering the consequences of varying the amount of discretion managers have in reporting current period expenses. We study the effects of altering GAAP on both the "internal agency problem" between current shareholders and their manager and the "external agency problem" between current and prospective shareholders. We show that the internal agency problem is ameliorated by expanding discretion, and we exhibit examples where expanding discretion is undesirable when the internal and external agency problems are present concurrently and the nonexpense-related components of earnings are measured with error. We establish that expanding discretion is welfare-enhancing if either the manager's contract is publicly observable or else the nonexpense-related components of earnings are measured without error. These results demonstrate the limitations of evaluating GAAP on a piecemeal, or issue-by-issue, basis.
This paper evaluates the effects of allowing auditors to limit their liability by incorporating. Using a model that integrates the audit market with the market for the firms being audited, it predicts that, once incorporation becomes an option, the least wealthy employed auditors under unlimited liability either exit the audit market or earn lower profits from auditing than before. The most wealthy employed auditors earn higher profits; they incorporate and remove wealth from their corporations. The model also explains the recent shift in auditors' attitudes toward incorporation, and why insurance and other wealth-sheltering devices imperfectly substitute for incorporation.
The article discusses the effects of a firm's voluntary disclosures on other firms. When Citibank reported the level of default on its Third World loans other banks followed with similar announcements. Following the write-off of Chambers Development for their waste disposal arrangements other waste management firms did the same. These disclosures were attempts to influence the financial market's assessment of the value of the firms rather than the product market behavior by management. Also, the disclosure dynamics of a firm's selection of a disclosure policy is related to its expected price.
There has been an enormous increase in auditing and accounting standards and in litigation against auditors; This paper examines some of the consequences of these changes by developing a model of the audit market relating auditors' liability to auditing standards. The paper demonstrates how equilibrium audit fees depend on both the informational value of the audit and the option value of the claim financial statement users have on the auditor's wealth in the event the audit is determined to have been substandard. Auditors' attitudes toward and responses to auditing standards are studied, and characteristics of optimal liability rules are evaluated.
The article presents information on the benefits of relative performance evaluation (RPE)-based schemes as it relates to agency theory. RPE determines compensation relative to the output of one's peers. When other firms' outputs reveal information about the manager's actions, agency theory predicts that managerial compensation will use relative performance. The author contends that under certain circumstances, RPE can be very effective in reducing moral hazard between principal and agent, regardless of the number of projects available to the agent.
In a single period agency model in which the agent has some discretion regarding how to report his period's performance, we show when the agent's contract is increasing in his report regardless of the characteristics of his production technology, and how to rank changes in the agent's reporting technology according to the expected cost of compensating the agent.
This paper studies a firm's decision to replace its auditor when the replacement affects outsiders' perceptions of its financial condition and auditors' attestations. If the auditor and firm possess common information about the firm's financial condition, and this information can be communicated through financial statements, then, quite generally, the auditor is never replaced. If the firm possesses information superior to that of the auditor and financial reports reflect only the auditor's information, then the auditor is more likely to be replaced the more favorable the firm's information and less favorable the auditor's information. Low-balling is explained by its effect on auditors' attest behavior, rather than by the cost differences of initial and repeat engagements.
The article presents an exploration into the auditor-client response to report-contingent audit contracts within an audit market model. Factors concerning positive and negative incentives to initiate such contracts are mentioned. The discrepancies inherent within the model between auditor's public issued estimates and personal opinions are analyzed and their impact on market competition for audit services is outlined. An application of Gresham's Law to auditing is presented, wherein poor quality services hinder legitimate services. Conclusions are offered regarding predictions of auditor attitudes towards standards due to revenue-based externalities.
The article presents a commentary on an article published earlier in this journal titled "Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal-agent context," by Stanley Baiman, Jerrold H. May, and Arijit Mukherji (BMM). The author raises concerns about the problem and model formation, focusing on the assumptions that are restrictive and have no economic implications. Additionally, the author suggests concern over the applicability and analysis of three cases in Proposition I and the comparative statics results. The author suggests that further research might expand the BMM study to include a multi or two-period world model to understand additional labor market effects and risk aversion.
This paper compares the disclosures firms would seek to make voluntarily with "optimal" mandated disclosures in a single period, multi-firm model, in which there are covariances between firms' cash flows. This comparison is important because, in those circumstances in which the two types of disclosure coincide, it is possible to economize on the process of setting mandatory disclosures. The principal factors which contribute to the existence or absence of a correspondence between mandatory and voluntary disclosures are (1) the nature of the externality associated with a firm's disclosure, (2) the relation between the risk preferences of the shareholders of the firms making the disclosures and outside investors, (3) how much relative weight is placed on existing shareholders and outside investors' preferences in the social welfare function determining the optimal mandatory disclosure policy, and (4) the covariance structure between firms' cash flows.
The article focuses on the internal demand for earnings management. It states that demand for earnings management comes from two sources: internal, meant to lessen expected costs of convincing management to adopt shareholders' preferred actions, and external, based on shareholders' interest in influencing potential investors' perception of their corporation's value. It comments on the implications of stock price reactions to announcements concerning corporate earnings and suggests there are times when shareholders are better served if management issues two distinct earnings announcements, one internal to help appraise managerial performance and influence their compensation, and the second external to influence opinions on the corporation's value in the eyes of investors.
Personal bankruptcy statutes are analyzed as social insurance agreements. The risk-sharing and incentive effects resulting from changes in bankruptcy laws are studied. It is shown that increasing the leniency of bankruptcy statutes may have unambiguous short-term benefits to potential bankrupts, but may be detrimental in the long-run.
Focuses on the opportunities for minimizing the cost of welfare programs. Consideration of payments-in-kind as an effective policy tool; Advantages of payments-in-kind over monetary payments; Impact of the monetary payments on the welfare program recipients.
This article considers a principal-agent problem in which the principal has access to a costly monitoring technology that can be used to acquire additional information about the agent's actions subsequent to observing the agent's output. Although randomized monitoring policies are feasible, we show that in a variety of contexts optimal monitoring policies are deterministic and ‘lower-tailed,’ that is, there exists some critical level of output such that further investigation of the agent's actions occurs if and only if output falls below this critical level.
The article presents a theory for the disclosure policies adopted by managers endowed with proprietary and nonproprietary information. This paper presents a theory for the disclosure policies adopted by managers endowed with proprietary and nonproprietary information. Proprietary information is defined as information whose disclosure reduces the present value of cash flows of the firm endowed with the information. This theory explains selective disclosure of management's information and the effects of changes in financial reporting requirements on firms' voluntary disclosure policies. Most existing theories of disclosure' conclude that, when credible announcements of private information are feasible, full disclosure is optimal. The results of this paper depend on the assumption that managers can make verifiable announcements regarding their private information. Since many studies assume that such announcements are not credible without being accompanied by costly signals, this assumption deserves some comment. In practice managers acquire private information about their firms by reading and drafting budgets.
Studies the development of an equilibrium model of costly contingent contracts. Specifications of the model; Definitions of spot market equilibrium and active contract market equilibrium; Influence of contracting cost on optimal contracts between consumers and producers; Characteristics of equilibrium contracts.
In this paper, I provide two theories about why management might withhold information which is not proprietary, together with an analysis of the consequences of altering various assumptions underlying these theories. Proprietary information is considered here as any information whose disclosure potentially alters a firm's future earnings gross of senior management's compensation. Even if a manager's private information is proprietary, shareholders may benefit occasionally from having this information disclosed (see Verrecchia [1983] and Dye [1984a]), although obvious explanations exist for the rarity of such disclosures. However, it is commonly believed that managers possess information about the firms they run, such as annual earnings' forecasts, whose release would affect the prices of their firms, but not the distribution of their firms' future earnings. The reluctance of managers to disclose such nonproprietary information is the subject of this paper.
Studies the factors affecting the optimal length of labor contracts through theories and models. Gray's macroeconomic theory of contract length; Analysis of the model of deterministic contract length; Comparative dynamics of contract length; Details on the stochastic length contracts.
In this paper, I evaluate the effects of mandatory changes in accounting standards on firms' disclosure decisions. Several issues are addressed, including the relation between mandatory reports and voluntary disclosures, the effects of imposing "consistency" in accounting choice, the consequences of increasing firms' discretion in accounting procedures, and the implications of requiring firms to issue "more detailed" accounting reports. The analysis of each of these issues depends critically on the firm's motivation for choosing among financial reporting techniques. Throughout this paper, I assume that a firm's choice among reporting requirements is influenced by how that choice alters its ability to protect its proprietary information. Since this is not a common assumption, some comment on its appropriateness is warranted.
This paper analyzes shareholders' incentives to sanction inside trading. I show that if a manager of a firm is initially compensated with earnings-contingent contracts, then the welfare of that manager and all of the firm's shareholders can be improved by allowing the manager to trade on his private information. This result is established in the context of a multiple principal (the shareholders)/single agent (the manager) model, with the manager's trades observable ex post, and is robust with respect to the specification of investors' preferences and the definition of stock market equilibrium.
This paper extends the theory of self-selection to circumstances in which economic agents have some access to markets. We use the analysis to explain the existence of multidimensional compensation packages in the presence of limited (re)marketability. Employment contracts that include fringe benefits are prominent examples of such multidimensional packages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
The recent interest in tournaments, where pay is based on performance relative to one's peers rather than solely on output, results from the observation that the differences in the pay of chief executives and their immediate subordinates seems to be greater than the difference in their abilities or outputs. However useful tournaments may be in explaining the salary differences, it is important to assess the limitations of tournaments and to examine the claimed virtues of tournaments as incentive devices. Four areas are criticized: 1. the implementation of a handicap system to account for differences in innate abilities of workers, 2. the instability arising from the introduction of other compensation schemes, 3. the possibility of collusion among players to reduce their effort levels, and 4. the determination of a tournament winner when outputs are multidimensional (as is usually the case).
The article looks at the various sorts of information used to determine the compensation that is given to managers. The author provides instances in which a superior can use signals as a means of valuing a manager's worth and addresses the moral hazards that this method creates and that are related to private communication. Traditional measures of assessing managers' work performance relied on management forecasts, standards, and bottom-up capital budgeting. The article concludes that auditing a manager's accounts can be used as an alternative to communication.
This course counts toward the following majors: Accounting.
This course acquaints students with the process used to construct and understand the financial reports of organizations. The objective is to understand the decisions that must be made in the financial reporting process and to develop the ability to evaluate and use accounting data. Emphasis is placed on understanding the breadth of accounting measurement practices and on being able to make the adjustments necessary for careful analysis. The course highlights the linkages between accounting information and management planning, and decision making and control.
This course studies models of economic roles of information and contracting in agency and adverse selection settings. Students will develop the model-building tools necessary to derive solutions in accounting research applications.
Accounting for Management Planning and Control details the use of financial information in management. Topics include profitability and performance measurement and activity-based management and decision support.
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