David Austen-Smith - Faculty - Kellogg School of Management

David Austen-Smith

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES; SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
Peter G. Peterson Professor of Corporate Ethics
Chair of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences

Overview
Vita
Research
Teaching

A distinguished scholar, David Austen-Smith is the Peter G. Peterson Professor of Corporate Ethics and Professor of Political Science and Economics. He has been a member of the Northwestern University faculty since 1996. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences in 2000, and is a Charter Member and an Elected Council Member of the Game Theory Society.

Professor Austen-Smith has published more than 60 papers in leading academic journals and edited volumes, and co-authored two volumes on Positive Political Theory. His work focuses on positive political theory, political economy, social choice and applied game theory. He is a Co-Editor of the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and an Associate Editor of Social Choice and Welfare and of Games and Economics Behavior.

He teaches courses on values-based leadership, and values and crisis decision making, being a recipient of the Sidney J. Levy Award for Teaching Excellence at the Kellogg School in 2005-06 and 2007-08.

Professor Austen-Smith received his PhD from Cambridge University. Prior to joining Northwestern University, he was a professor at the University of Rochester and the University of York, England.

Areas of Expertise

Ethics
Political Economy/Design
Voting Systems

Recent Media Coverage

The Mint (Dow Jones publication in India): Reasons behind public choices - 12/3/2007

See all Kellogg in the Media

Recent Kellogg News

Intensive Kellogg workshop offers leadership resources for women - 4/29/2008

Can firms ‘do well and good’? It depends, says Kellogg Prof. Daniel Diermeier - 2/20/2008

See all Kellogg News

Education

PhD, 1978, Economics, University of Cambridge

BS, 1974, Economics, University of Bristol, England, First Class Honors

Academic Positions

Peter G. Peterson Professor of Corporate Ethics, Northwestern University, 2006-present

Professor of Political Science and Economics, Weinberg College of Arts of Sciences, Northwestern University, 1996-present

Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy, Northwestern University, 2004-2006

Ethel and John Lindgren Professor, Northwestern University, 2000-2004

Professor of Management and Strategy (by courtesy), Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 1996-2000

Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, 1991-1996

Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, 1984-1991

Lecturer in Economics, University of York, 1977-1984

Editorial Positions

Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior, 1997-Present

Associate Editor, Social Choice and Welfare, 2005-Present

Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory, 1997-2005

Associate Editor, Journal of Public Economics, 1998-2005

Founding Editor, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2005

Guest Editor, Political Science special issue, Journal of Economic Theory, 2002

Editorial Board, American Journal of Political Science, 1999-2001

Editorial Board, American Political Science Review, 1995-2001

Associate Editor, Bulletin of Economic Research, 1989-1999

Co-Editor, Economics and Poltics, 1991-1997

Research Interests

Political economy, social choice and welfare, deliberation, income distribution

Articles

Austen-Smith, David and Timothy Feddersen. 2009. Information Aggregation and Communication in Committees. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. B 364(1518): 763-769.

Austen-Smith, David and Timothy Feddersen. 2008. In Response to Jurg Steiner's "Concept Stretching: The Case of Deliberation". European Political Science. 7(2): 191-193.

Austen-Smith, David and Timothy Feddersen. 2006. Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty and Voting Rules. American Political Science Review. 100(2): 209-217.

Austen-Smith, David and Michael Wallerstein. 2006. Redistribution and affirmative action. Journal of Public Economics. 90(10-11): 1789-1823.

Austen-Smith, David and Roland G. Fryer Jr.. 2005. An Economic Analysis of 'Acting White'. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 120(2): 551-583.

Austen-Smith, David. 2003. Majority Preference for Subsidies over Redistribution. Journal of Public Economics. 87(7): 1617-1640.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 2002. Costly Signaling and Cheap Talk in Models of Political Influence. European Journal of Political Economy. 18(2): 263-280.

Austen-Smith, David, Jeffrey S. Banks and Aldo Rustichini. 2002. Symposium on Political Science. Journal of Economic Theory. 103(1)

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 2000. Cheap Talk and Burned Money. Journal of Economic Theory. 91(1): 1-16.

Austen-Smith, David. 2000. Redistributing income under proportional representation. Journal of Political Economy. 108(6): 1235-1269.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1999. Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model. Social Choice and Welfare. 16(4): 663-672.

Austen-Smith, David. 1998. Allocating Access for Information and Contributions. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 14(2): 277-303.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1998. Social Choice Theory, Game Theory and Positive Political Theory. Annual Review of Political Science. 1: 259-287.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1996. Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review. 90(1): 34-45.

Austen-Smith, David and John Wright. 1996. Theory and evidence for counteractive lobbying. American Journal of Political Science. 40(2): 543-564.

Austen-Smith, David. 1995. Campaign Contributions and Access. American Political Science Review. 89(3): 566-582.

Austen-Smith, David and John Wright. 1994. Counteractive Lobbying. American Journal of Political Science. 38(1): 25-44.

Austen-Smith, David. 1994. Strategic Transmission of Costly Information. Econometrica. 62(4): 955-963.

Austen-Smith, David. 1993. Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes. American Journal of Political Science. 37(3): 799-833.

Austen-Smith, David. 1993. Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule. Games and Economic Behavior. 5(1): 3-43.

Austen-Smith, David and John Wright. 1992. Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote. Social Choice and Welfare. 9(3): 229-257.

Austen-Smith, David. 1992. Explaining the Vote: Constituency Constraints on Sophisticated Voting. American Journal of Political Science. 36(1): 68-89.

Reprinted in:

Frontiers of Game Theory, edited by K. Binmore, A. Krman and P. Tani, 49-70. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

Austen-Smith, David. 1992. Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making. International Political Science Review. 13(1)

Austen-Smith, David and Patricia O'Brien. 1992. Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Voting. Economica. 59(234): 199-219.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1991. Monotonicity in Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review. 85(2): 531-537.

Austen-Smith, David. 1991. Rational consumers and irrational voters: a review essay on "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory". Economics and Politics. 3(1): 73-92.

Austen-Smith, David and William Riker. 1990. Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation: Correction. American Political Science Review. 84(1): 243-245.

Austen-Smith, David. 1990. Credible Debate Equilibria. Social Choice and Welfare. 7(1): 75-93.

Austen-Smith, David. 1990. Information Transmission in Debate. American Journal of Political Science. 34(1): 124-152.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1990. Stable governments and the allocation of policy portfolios. American Political Science Review. 84(3): 891-906.

Austen-Smith, David. 1989. Sincere Voting in Models of Legislative Elections. Social Choice and Welfare. 6(4): 287-299.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1988. Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes. American Political Science Review. 82(2): 405-422.

Reprinted in:

Rational Choice Politics, edited by Torun Dewan, Keith Dowding, Kenneth A. Shepsle, London: SAGE Publications, 2009.

Austen-Smith, David and William Riker. 1987. Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation. American Political Science Review. 81(3): 891-918.

Austen-Smith, David. 1987. Interdependent Decision Making in Nonprofit Industries: A Simultaneous Equation Analysis of English Provincial Theatre. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 5(2): 149-174.

Austen-Smith, David. 1987. Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions and Probabilistic Voting. Public Choice. 54(2): 123-140.

Austen-Smith, David. 1987. Parties, Districts and the Spatial Theory of Elections. Social Choice and Welfare. 4(1): 9-23.

Austen-Smith, David. 1987. Sophisticated sincerity: voting over endogenous agendas. American Political Science Review. 81(4): 1323-1330.

Reprinted in:

Rational Choice Politics, edited by Torun Dewan, Keith Dowding, Kenneth A. Shepsle, London: SAGE Publications, 2009.

Austen-Smith, David. 1986. Legislative Coalitions and Electoral Equilibrium. Public Choice. 50(1-3): 185-211.

Austen-Smith, David. 1985. A Multiperiod Model of Nonprofit Enterprises. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 32(2): 119-134.

Austen-Smith, David. 1984. Subsidies to the Arts with Multiple Public Donors. Economic Record. 60(171): 381-389.

Austen-Smith, David. 1984. The pure theory of large two-candidate elections: comment on the Ledyard paper. Public Choice. 44(1): 43-48.

Austen-Smith, David. 1984. Two party competition with many constituencies. Mathematical Social Sciences. 7(2): 177-198.

Austen-Smith, David. 1983. The spatial theory of electoral competition: instability, institutions and information. Environment and Planning, Series C: Government and Policy. 1(4): 439-459.

Austen-Smith, David. 1982. Grant-Giving to Provincial Repertory Theatres by the Arts Council of Great Britain. Journal of Cultural Economics. 6(2): 57-79.

Austen-Smith, David. 1982. Restricted Pareto and Rights. Journal of Economic Theory. 26(1): 89-99.

Austen-Smith, David. 1981. Party Policy and Campaign Costs in a Multiconstituency Model of Electoral Competition. Public Choice. 37(3): 389-403.

Austen-Smith, David. 1981. Voluntary pressure groups. Economica. 48(190): 143-153.

Austen-Smith, David. 1980. Individual Contribution to Public Goods. Economics Letters. 5(4): 359-361.

Austen-Smith, David. 1980. On Justifying Subsidies to the Performing Arts.

Reprinted in:

1994.

Austen-Smith, David. 1980. On the Impact of Revenue Subsidies on Repertory Theatre Policy. Journal of Cultural Economics. 4(1): 9-17.

Austen-Smith, David. 1979. Fair Rights. Economics Letters. 4(1): 29-32.

Working Papers

Austen-Smith, David and Timothy Feddersen. 2007. A Note on Preference Uncertainty and Communication in Committee.

Austen-Smith, David and Timothy Feddersen. Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy.

Book Chapters

Austen-Smith, David. 2008. "Political Competition." In New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by Lawrence Blume and Steven N. Durlauf, London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2nd edition.

Austen-Smith, David. 2008. "Introduction to section on Inequality and Redistribution." In Selected Works of Michael Wallerstein, edited by D. Austen-Smith, J.Frieden, M.Golden, K.Moene,A.Przeworski, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Austen-Smith, David and Arthur Lupia. 2007. "Information in Elections." In Positive Changes in Political Science: The Legacy of Richard McKelvey's Most Influential Writings, edited by John H. Aldrich, James E. Alt and Arthur Lupia, 295-314. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Austen-Smith, David. 2006. "Economic Methods in Positive Political Theory." In Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by Barry W. Weingast and Donald Wittman, 899-914. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Austen-Smith, David and Timothy Feddersen. 2005. "Deliberation and Voting Rules." In Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks, edited by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, Springer-Verlag.

Austen-Smith, David. 1996. "Electing Legislatures." In Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, edited by Schofield_Norman, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Austen-Smith, David. 1996. "Interest Groups: Money, Information and Influence." In Perspectives on Public Choice, edited by Mueller_Dennis C., Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Austen-Smith, David. 1996. "Refinements of the Heart." In Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, edited by Schofield_Norman, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "Information Acquisition and Orthogonal Argument." In Political Economy: Instittutions, Competition and Representation, edited by Barnett_William A, Hinich_Melvin J, and Schofield_Norman, Canbridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1989. "Electoral Accountability and Incumbency." In Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, edited by Ordeshook_Peter, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.

Other

Austen-Smith, David and Timothy Feddersen. "Deliberation and Voting Rules.".

Books

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 2005. Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure. University of Michigan Press.

Austen-Smith, David. Positive Political Theory II: Some Corrections.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1999. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. University of Michigan Press.

Edited Volumes

Austen-Smith, David and John Duggan, eds.. 2005. Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks. Springer-Verlag.

Austen-Smith, David, J. Frieden, M. Golden, K. Moene and A. Przeworski, eds.. The Politics of Inequality, Labor, and Social Democracy: Selected Works of Michael Wallerstein. Cambridge University Press.

Cases

Austen-Smith, David, Adam D. Galinsky, K. H. Chung and C. LaVanway. 2007. Unilever’s Mission for Vitality. Case 5-307-501 (KEL364).

Dove and Axe were two highly successful brands owned by Unilever, a portfolio company. Dove was a female-oriented beauty product brand that exhorted “real beauty” and not the unachievable standards that the media portrayed. In contrast, Axe was a brand that purportedly “gives men the edge in the mating game.” Their risqué commercials always portrayed the supermodel-type beauty ideal that Dove was trying to change. Unilever had always been a company of brands where the consumer knew the brands but not the company; but recently there had been the idea to unify the company with an umbrella mission for all of its brands. This would turn Unilever into a company with brands, potentially increasing consumer awareness and encourage cross-purchases between the different brands. However, this raised the question about conflicting messages between the brands’ marketing campaigns, most notably between Unilever’s two powerhouse brands, Dove and Axe.

The case starts with COO Alan Jope thinking about an upcoming press meeting in New York City to discuss Unilever’s current (2005) performance and announce Unilever’s decision to create an umbrella mission statement for the company. The case is focused on the central question of whether or not consistency between brand messages is necessary or inherently problematic.

The Unilever’s Mission for Vitality case was created to help students and managers develop an appreciation for how the values underlying a marketing campaign can affect and alter an organization’s culture. The case focuses on how two products/marketing campaigns that express conflicting underlying values (as reflected in the Dove Real Beauty and the Axe Effect campaigns) within the same corporation can give rise to a number of unintended organizational and marketing complications.The learning objective of the case is to develop, first, an appreciation of how the expressed values underlying a marketing campaign can affect internal corporate culture and, therefore, how two products with conflicting underlying values (in this case, those reflected in the Dove and Axe campaigns) within a given corporation (in this case, Unilever) can give rise to organizational and marketing complications. And second, to explore how managers might best anticipate and respond to the conflicts inherent in such complications.

Teaching Interests

Political economy; non-market strategy; values

Executive MBA

Ethics and Leadership (MORSX-472-0)
Ethics and Leadership examines the anatomy of leadership in modern organizations, highlighting the ethical challenges facing corporate leaders in the rapidly changing business environment.

Full-Time / Part-Time MBA

Values and Crisis Decision Making (SEEK-440-A)

This course counts toward the following majors: Social Enterprise

In recent decades corporations have increasingly become the dominant source for political and social change. Increased globalization and technological progress have further accelerated this process. Businesses are now held accountable by standards other than legal compliance or financial performance. Successful business leaders have recognized that these challenges are best mastered by a commitment to values-based management. However, simply "doing the right thing" is not enough. Rather, companies increasingly find themselves as targets of aggressive legal action, media coverage and social pressure. Organizations must be prepared to handle rapidly changing environments and anticipate potential threats. This requires a deep understanding of the strategic complexities in managing various stakeholders and constituencies. To confront students with these challenges in a realistic fashion, the class is structured around a rich set of challenging case studies and crisis simulation exercises.

Values-Based Leadership (SEEK-460-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Management & Organizations, Social Enterprise.

The first issue a leader in the role of manager, entrepreneur, investor or stakeholder must address about an organization concerns its "value proposition," whether deciding to enter an industry or to begin an undertaking. However, this analysis is incomplete if leaders fail to consider the wider impact of the organization's actions on its own employees and on society. This course focuses on the problem of incorporating a wide variety of value perspectives into decision-making. Values-based leadership involves the ability to take the disparate value propositions of various stakeholders and integrate them into a coherent vision. We explore how recognizing and incorporating competing values claims throughout the organization is often facilitated and hindered by a number of psychological, organizational and cultural processes. Students will come to understand the variety of underlying mechanisms managers of organizations typically have at their disposal to successfully implement values objectives and select among different approaches, while anticipating the constraints placed on choice by the organization's market and non-market environments.

CONTACT INFO:
PHONE: 847-467-3496
FAX: 847-467-1220

EMAIL:
dasm
@northwestern.edu

OFFICE:
Jacobs Center Room 569