MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES
Professor of Managerial Economics
Nabil Al-Najjar is a Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences. He serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Mathematical Economics and the International Journal of Game Theory.
Al-Najjar’s research focuses on the development of learning-based models of decision making in markets, games and contracts. His papers have been published in top scholarly journals such the Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and the RAND Journal of Economics, among others.
For his excellence in teaching, Al-Najjar has twice been the recipient of the school’s Sidney J. Levy Award, in 1996-97 for his class in microeconomics, and 2006-07 for his class in competitive strategy. He has received the Chairs’ Core Teaching Award for his class in microeconomics.
Al-Najjar received his PhD in Economics from the University of Minnesota. Prior to joining the Kellogg faculty in 1995, he was a faculty member at the University of Québec in Montreal.
Game Theory
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We show that a simple "reputation-style" test can always identify which of two experts is informed about the true distribution. The test presumes no prior knowledge of the true distribution, achieves any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time, and does not use "counterfactual" predictions. Our analysis capitalizes on a result of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) on the rate of convergence of supermartingales. We use our setup to shed some light on the apparent paradox that a strategically motivated expert can ignorantly pass any test. We point out that this paradox arises because in the single-expert setting, any mixed strategy for Nature over distributions is reducible to a pure strategy. This eliminates any meaningful sense in which Nature can randomize. Comparative testing reverses the impossibility result because the presence of an expert who knows the realized distribution eliminates the reducibility of Nature's compound lotteries.
Psychological and experimental evidence, as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples, suggests that firms may confound fixed, sunk and variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This paper investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions. We envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real-world accounting practices, including ones that confuse the relevance of variable, fixed, and sunk costs to pricing decisions. Firms follow "naive" adaptive learning to adjust prices and reinforcement learning to modify their costing methodologies. Costing and pricing practices that increase profits are reinforced. In some market structures, but not in others, this process of reinforcement causes pricing practices of all firms to systematically depart from standard equilibrium predictions.
We consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically. Specifically, a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders' reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy. In our model, some traders may have non-vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy. Although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved, we show that, given any desired level of approximation, there is N such that any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of any competitive mechanism of any private information economy with N or more traders leads, with high probability, to prices and allocations that are close to a competitive equilibrium of the true economy. In particular, allocations are approximately efficient. A key assumption is that there is small probability that traders behave non-strategically.
This paper introduces a new model of environments with a large number of agents and stochastic characteristics. We consider sequences of finite but increasingly large economies that `discretize' the continuum. In the limit we obtain a model that is continuum-like in important respects, yet it has a countable set of agents with a finitely additive, `uniform' distribution. In this model, the law of large numbers is meaningful and holds on all subintervals. This framework provides, among other things, a new interpretation of the measurability problem and the failure of the law of large numbers in the continuum. It is also shown that the Pettis integral in the continuum coincides with the empirical frequencies in the discrete model almost surely. Finally, the model is used to study a mechanism design problem in a large economy with private information.
I study individuals who use statistical models to draw secure or robust inferences from iid data. The main contribution of the paper is a steady-state model in which distinct statistical models are consistent with empirical evidence, even as data increases without bound. Individuals may hold different beliefs and interpret their environment differently even though they know each other's statistical model and base their inferences on identical data. The behavior modeled here is that of rational individuals confronting an environment in which learning is hard, rather than ones beset by cognitive limitations or behavioral biases.
Boeing and Airbus are contemplating entry into Very Large Aircraft (VLA) market. Both firms are convinced the market cannot support two players due the extremely high R&D costs and the limited (and highly uncertain) state of demand. The key strategic issue is the uncertainty surrounding Boeing’s development cost: To what extent would Boeing’s experience with the 747 help it reduce the R&D cost of a new VLA prototype? The main point of the case is that Boeing’s strategic moves signal its private information, and that this eliminates any first mover advantage Boeing might have had in this market.
The case describes market experiments conducted by a major credit card issuer. In a typical experiment, the issuer sends out hundreds of thousands of solicitations based on information received from credit reporting agencies (e.g. credit score, past delinquencies, etc.). Selection bias is striking: the average risk profile of those responding to higher interest rates is significantly worse than that of respondents to lower rates. Tracking respondents for 27 months after the experiment, respondents to higher rates displayed significantly higher delinquency and bankruptcy rates. This short case is based on an excellent research paper by Larry Ausubel who obtained proprietary data on the condition of not revealing the name of the issuer. Contact Professor Al-Najjar for teaching methods, slides, and classroom exhibits.
Motorola invented mobile telephones and by the end of the 1980s came to dominate the mobile handset market with more than 80 percent market share. A few years later, Motorola faced a key strategic choice of whether to focus its considerable resources on consolidating its dominance of the analogue handset market, or to shift these resources to the emerging digital handset technologies. This decision shaped the handset industry and the role Motorola played in it for the next decade. The case provides a vivid illustration of incumbents’ puzzling inertia towards initiating and participating in disruptive technologies.
Radio broadcasting is characterized by diffused taste for programming and highly fragmented supply of content. Satellite radio is a major technological breakthrough that promises to reshape this industry by, among other things, satisfying a greater diversity in tastes and promoting greater variety in content provision. A major issue is that the economies of scale are such that it is unlikely for more than a few (currently, just two) providers to operate in this market due to the considerable infrastructure and content costs.
This case studies the impact of tariffs, subsidies, and quotas on the U.S. steel market. It pays particular attention to "winners" and "losers" from different policies. The impact of these policies is illustrated via applications to the events in the U.S. steel market in 2001.
Since 1981, the U.S. federal government has operated a price support program to help sugar beet and sugar cane producers and processors. This complex program works through a combination of loans, import quotas, and duties. As a result, sugar prices in the United States are significantly higher than world prices. For example, in December 2001, U.S. consumers paid 22.9 cents per pound, while the world price was just 9 cents per pound. The General Accounting Office estimates that the total cost to consumers is $1.9 billion a year. This case uses a simple demand-and-supply framework, using real-world data, to assess the economic and political consequences of the U.S. sugar program. The case provides students with a vivid, fact-based illustration of welfare concepts such as consumer surplus, producer surplus, and dead-weight loss in a concrete, real-world market context.
Demand in some markets displays a strong taste for variety. This means that the market consists of small niches, each with strong preference for a distinct version of the basic product. Examples include markets with strong local character (local video stores, dry cleaning, etc.), products appealing to specialized tastes (micro-brewed beer, specialty restaurants), and markets for entertainment content. Car retailing falls into this category because demand is fundamentally local in nature. A key strategy in such industry is consolidation. This case studies attempts at consolidating automobile retailing, emphasizing their pitfalls and showing that they were based on overly optimistic assessment of the potential economies of scale and creation of customer value. The learning objectives are to introduce the concept of demand with strong taste for variety, as well as economies of scale and consolidation strategies.
Demand in some markets displays a strong taste for variety. This means that the market consists of small niches, each with strong preference for a distinct version of the basic product. Examples include markets with strong local character (local video stores, dry cleaning, etc.), products appealing to specialized tastes (micro-brewed beer, specialty restaurants), and markets for entertainment content. Car retailing falls into this category because demand is fundamentally local in nature. A key strategy in such industry is consolidation. This case studies attempts at consolidating automobile retailing, emphasizing their pitfalls and showing that they were based on overly optimistic assessment of the potential economies of scale and creation of customer value. The learning objectives are to introduce the concept of demand with strong taste for variety, as well as economies of scale and consolidation strategies.
Demand in some markets displays a strong taste for variety. This means that the market consists of small niches, each with strong preference for a distinct version of the basic product. Examples include markets with strong local character (local video stores, dry cleaning, etc.), products appealing to specialized tastes (micro-brewed beer, specialty restaurants), and markets for entertainment content. Car retailing falls into this category because demand is fundamentally local in nature. A key strategy in such industry is consolidation. This case studies attempts at consolidating automobile retailing, emphasizing their pitfalls and showing that they were based on overly optimistic assessment of the potential economies of scale and creation of customer value. The learning objectives are to introduce the concept of demand with strong taste for variety, as well as economies of scale and consolidation strategies.
The case studies the U.S. credit card industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s. After an industry background, a discussion of generic strategies follows in which strategies like product proliferation and cost improvements are achieved through superior IT. These strategies are exemplified using the leading players in the industry. On the other hand, these strategies are easily imitable, the basic product is standardized, and the industry is highly fragmented. What accounts then for the exceptional level of profitability enjoyed by this industry? Learning Objective: The goal is to introduce psychological biases as a force that can shape industry performance. Evidence is provided showing that consumers’ attitude towards credit is prone to “irrational” failure to exercise self-control and inability to fully anticipate future borrowing behavior. A simple model is provided showing that these peculiarities in consumer psychology enable an industry, with otherwise little inherent drivers of superior profitability, to achieve superior performance. Ethical and regulatory issues are then debated.
This course counts toward the following majors: Decision Sciences.
Provides frameworks for reasoning about decisions in uncertain environments. Case studies and experiments are used to motivate the importance of probabilistic reasoning to avoid the systematic biases that cloud managers' decision making. Formal probabilistic tools are introduced and their relevance to modern business issues is conveyed via cases, exercises, and class experiments. Some of the applications include: inventory management with uncertain demand, principal-agent models, herd behavior, selection bias, rare events, real options and risk. The course is self-contained, and should be of value to all students, including those with prior exposure to formal probability models.
Microeconomic Analysis (MECN-430-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Managerial Economics.
Among the topics this core course addresses are economic analysis and optimal decisions, consumer choice and the demand for products, production functions and cost curves, market structures and strategic interactions, and pricing and non-price concepts. Cases and problems are used to understand economic tools and their potential for solving real-world problems.
Prerequisite: DECS-434, or concurrent registration.
Competitive Strategy and Industrial Structure (MECN-441-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Consulting, Management & Strategy, Managerial Economics.
The course studies the determinants nature of competitive strategy in a variety of industry structures. The course considers how the structure of a firm's industry affects its strategic choices and performance. Topics include the dynamic aspects of pricing, entry and predation in concentrated industries, and product differentiation, product proliferation and innovation as competitive strategies.
Macroeconomic Analysis For Management (MECN-450-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Managerial Economics
This course provides an overview of modern macroeconomic issues, debates, crises and solutions. Macroeconomic models and case studies are used to better understand the historical and current behavior of the economy as a whole, to better understand the sources of the various historical and current controversies concerning macroeconomic policy and to analyze the effects of macroeconomic phenomena on managerial decision making. The first part of the course concentrates on long-run issues: the wealth of nations, economic growth, the effects of international trade and the effects of government policies on such long-run issues. The course examines the determination of employment, output, prices, wages, interest rates, national saving, investment and international flows of goods, services and assets. The second part of the course concentrates on short-run issues such as inflation, the business cycle and policies attempting to stabilize the economy's short-run fluctuations. The final part of the course focuses on international currency crises, foreign economic fluctuations and current macroeconomic policies that contribute to and combat such problems.
Economics of Competition prepares students to diagnose the determinants of an industry’s structure and formulate rational, competitive strategies for coping with that structure.
Strategic Issues in Commodity Industries (MECNX-442-0)
Strategic Issues in Commodity Industries introduces students to state-of-the-art models for the analysis of commodity markets. These include powerful frameworks for forecasting price trends, incorporating real options and herd behaviors in pricing models, and economic drivers of public policies and regulations.
This PhD-level course on decision theory focuses on axiomatic theories of individual decision making under risk and uncertainty. The course briefly explores utility theory under certainty and the notion of preferences and their representation, then progresses to the classic theories of decision under risk and uncertainty: von Neumann and Morgenstern, Anscombe and Aumann, and Savage. This lasts roughly half the course and constitutes a basic grounding in the subject. From there the course explores topics that expand on the classical work and are nearer to the current research frontier. These topics may include Allais Paradox, Prospect Theory and Machina's approach; Ellsberg's paradox, uncertainty aversion, and Gilboa and Schmeidler representations; dynamics - Bayesian updating, consistency, preferences over the timing of the resolution of risk/uncertainty; and notions of belief and probability in decision making.
Selected Topics in Economic Theory (MECS-468-2)
Selected Topics in Economic Theory
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