Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
In dynamic collective decision-making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2012. Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs. American Economic Review. 102(4): 1446-1476.